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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the 1990s, transnational organised crime (TOC) has emerged as a threat to 
national and international security. As a result, the United Nations implemented the 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) in 2000, which aims to 
improve international legislation and facilitate cooperation between state parties. This 
research aims to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the UNTOC and the European 
Union’s framework, as well as take advantage of a comparative analysis so as to determine 
whether the international legal system may benefit from elements employed at EU level. 
Moreover, key challenges facing implementation and monitoring on an international level 
are addressed. Finally, traditional as well as non-traditional measures to combat organised 
crime are proposed which may be used so as to strengthen the international legal 
framework and to overcome weaknesses of the current framework. The above mentioned 
aims were achieved by conducting doctrinal (‘black letter law’) research, doctrinal 
research searching secondary authority, socio-legal research (‘law in practice’) and, finally, 
comparative cross-jurisdictional research. The research found that the fight against TOC 
has been characterised by the definitional opaqueness of TOC and the complexity intrinsic 
to law enforcement and judicial cooperation.  Nevertheless, the convention provides a solid 
basis for mutual legal assistance and law-enforcement cooperation. The UNTOC serves as 
a framework of international legislation and facilitates cooperation between state parties. It 
does not constitute an operational treaty, which oversees specific crime-fighting activities. 
As a whole, state parties remain wary of using the UNTOC as it does not provide a clear, 
elaborate concept upon which states may rely, legislate and train around.  New practices 
and legal innovations, such as the establishment of joint investigation teams or the 
integration of other fields of law, need to be considered in order to address all facets of 
TOC, be it cross-border criminality or economic changes. Consequently, an integrated and 
comprehensive strategy, which takes into account the fluid, globalised nature of criminal 
networks, as well as their sophisticated tactics, needs to be developed.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Transnational organised crime (TOC) has emerged as a threat to national and 
international security, with societal, economic and political implications that may result in 
the destabilisation of states and society. By the 1990s, transnational organised crime had 
increased in scale and scope in large part due to the increased transnational flow of people, 
goods, and money, as well as a transition towards free-market economies and democracies 
and the heightening of civil unrest.1 As a result, the United Nations implemented the 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) in 2000. The convention 
became a landmark on the subject, given that it represents a legal instrument designed to 
improve international legislation and facilitate cooperation between countries.2 All states 
that have signed and ratified this convention attest to adopting various measures against 
transnational organised crime, such as its criminalisation in national legislation and 
implementation of law enforcement procedures associated with the accusation, trial, 
sanctions, jurisdiction, extraditions, as well as forms of mutual legal assistance and joint 
investigations.3 However, criticism of the UNTOC has been expressed concerning the 
scope of the convention, as well as the definition of transnational organised crime itself.4 
Moreover, given the rapidly changing nature of TOC, the ‘UNTOC does not adequately 
account for the increasingly activity-based, horizontal structure of criminal syndicates or 
the growing nexus between organized crime and terrorism, corruption, conflict, public 
health, global finance, and modern technology.’5  As such, it is becoming increasingly 
important to strengthen international norms so as to respond effectively to the ever-
growing threat and ‘its ability to exacerbate conflicts, spoil peace processes and undermine 
state consolidation’.6 In this thesis, it is argued that the international legal framework for 
																																																						
1 Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies (OUP 2010). 
2 André Standing, ‘Transnational Organized Crime and the Palermo Convention: A Reality Check’ 
(International Peace Institute 2010). 
3 Paulo Pereira, ‘The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Its Ambiguities’ (The 
International Relations and Security Network,  8 November 2013) <http://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-
relations/the-un-convention-against-transnational-organized-crime-and-its-ambiguities> accessed 18 October 
2015. 
4 Petrus van Duyne and Mark Nelemans, ‘Transnational Organized Crime: thinking in and out of Plato’s 
cave’ in Felia Allum and Stan Gilmour (eds), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime 
(Routledge 2011). 
5 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The Global Regime for Transnational Crime’ (Council on Foreign 
Relations, 25 June 2013) <http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/global-regime-transnational-
crime/p28656#p2> accessed 18 October 2015. 
6 The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, ‘Ignoring or Interfering? Development 
Approaches to Transnational Organized Crime’ (The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized 
Crime 2014). 
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combatting transnational organised crime must be revised so as to improve the capacity of 
states to adapt to the challenges posed by globalisation, through the promotion of a 
strategic and coordinated modus operandi that goes beyond the focus on criminal justice 
provisions and approaches, allowing for innovative strategies and a more multi-
dimensional understanding. In particular, since a common direction and goals appear to be 
absent on a global scale.  
 
Analysis of the international legal framework to combat transnational organised 
crime and recommendations regarding improvements thereof are important because 
organised crime may be considered a significant threat to development and security, given 
that TOC has the ability to incessantly adapt to changes at the local and international 
levels, to establish transnational networks and enlarge operations so as to maximise the 
possibilities presented by globalisation.  
 
Existing academic research on transnational organised crime extends across various 
academic areas and covers numerous aspects, including criminal activities, the typologies 
of organised criminal group’s structures and the control exerted by established criminal 
networks such as the Yakuza or Mafia over territories and illegal markets. The majority of 
research, however, focuses on one particular type of crime, and is limited to a particular 
geographical area, or is concerned with specific criminal networks such as those mentioned 
above. A limited number of scholars, for instance Tom Obokata, Francesco Calderoni, Neil 
Boister and Pierre Hauck, have focussed on the suppression of TOC through international 
law.7 Research into organised crime on the European level has been limited, research being 
primarily focused on organised crime within member states or the ‘Europeanisation’ of 
criminal law and procedure in general. Hence, research into TOC must be more 
transnational in nature in order to carry out a comparative perspective and promote 
international cooperation to develop a comprehensive framework to combat transnational 
organised crime.  
 
The research conducted here does not merely aim to provide an overview of the 
international legal framework for fighting transnational organised crime. Especially, since 
																																																						
7 See for example Tom Obokata, Transnational organised crime in international law (Hart Publishing 2010); 
Francesco Calderoni, Organized Crime Legislation in the European Union. Harmonization and 
Approximation of Criminal Law, National Legislations and the EU Framework Decision on the Fight 
Against Organized Crime (Springer 2010); Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law 
(OUP 2012) and Pierre Hauck and Sven Peterke (eds), International Law and Transnational Organised 
Crime (OUP 2016). 
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research on transnational organised crime has primarily focused on a specific type of 
crime, rather than focusing on international responses. Instead, its aim is to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations’ Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime and the European Union’s (EU) framework, and to take advantage of a 
comparative analysis so as to determine whether the international legal system may benefit 
from elements employed at EU level. Moreover, key challenges facing implementation and 
monitoring on an international level are addressed. Finally, the researcher intends to 
propose traditional as well as non-traditional measures to combat organised crime, which 
may be used so as to strengthen the international legal framework and to overcome 
weaknesses of the current framework.  
 
In order to achieve the above mentioned aims, the scope of this thesis is limited to 
the analysis of the UNTOC, and its protocols, as well as EU legislation pertaining to 
organised crime and to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. As such, no further 
legal frameworks or conventions relating to specific organised crimes, such as the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), are analysed in detail within this study. 
These jurisdictions were chosen, as the UNTOC presents the only multilateral treaty 
against transnational organised crime and the EU’s framework may be regarded as 
supranational rather than merely intergovernmental, allowing it to be classified as 
‘international’. The UNTOC’s key provisions with regards to criminalisation and mutual 
legal assistance will be analysed, as well as organised crime legislation of the European 
Union that may be applied to transnational organised crime as a whole. Legislation 
pertaining to European initiatives in the field of mutual assistance in criminal matters has 
been carefully selected so as to only include measures aiming to fulfil the Union’s 
objective of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice. Traditional and non-
traditional measures to strengthen the international system are limited to examples, 
considered to be pertinent, innovative and attainable.   
 
The third chapter discusses the historical context of transnational organised crime, 
its contemporary manifestation and provides an explanation as to why TOC manifests 
itself as a major security issue. In order to gain insight into the nature of TOC, as well as to 
illustrate its importance, examples of transnational organised crimes will be presented. The 
fourth chapter discusses TOC in international law, focusing on its rather problematic 
definition, the obligations of states under international law and introducing the main 
international instruments in the fight against TOC, as well as their strengths and 
weaknesses. The fifth chapter constitutes of an in-depth analysis of the UNTOC as well as 
CHAPTER I 
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key challenges facing its implementation and issues surrounding the monitoring of 
implementation. The sixth chapter discusses the European Union’s approach to 
transnational organised crime and provides a rigorous evaluation of key legislation on 
organised crime, as well as legislation concerning mutual assistance in criminal matters. 
Furthermore, this chapter will compare and contrast regional and international cooperation 
to determine each system’s strength and weaknesses and whether the international 
framework may benefit from the approaches taken at the regional level. The seventh 
chapter explores means to strengthen the international legal system through transnational 
measures, such as mutual legal assistance, and non-traditional measures, such as peace 
operations. Finally, the thesis will conclude with an outlook into the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current system, results of the comparative analysis and suggestions with 
a view to future developments. 
 19 
 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to investigate the international legal framework for fighting transnational 
organised crime, with a particular focus on the UNTOC as well as organised crime 
legislation in the EU, this study employs research methods that are interpretative and 
analytical in nature. The research was conducted in four distinct core phases: (i) doctrinal 
(‘black letter law’) research in order to foster a deeper understanding of various primary 
sources of law; (ii) doctrinal research searching secondary authority; (iii) socio-legal 
research (‘law in practice) to address the content of legal practice from a variety of 
perspectives and (iv) comparative cross-jurisdictional research so as to cross-examine 
issues of context, comparison, interaction and interpretation on an international and 
regional scale.  
 
Doctrinal research, known as well as ‘black letter law’, was employed so as to 
interpret the formulation of legal ‘doctrine’ through the analysis of legal rules to be found 
within various sources of law. Materials and methods, out of which the rules and principles 
regulating the international community are developed, include treaties, international 
customs, and general principles of law. Treaties and their protocols were found using the 
online portal of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which provides 
all crime-related treaties that sustain its operational work. On a regional basis, the special 
example of European community law was assessed, which is derived, inter alia, from 
treaty provisions, regulations, directives and decisions. Access to the aforementioned 
sources was gained using EUR-Lex, a service that provides legal texts of the EU online. 
Moreover, so as to substantiate various arguments, case law was included. As such, 
doctrinal research was used as a prerequisite for undertaking further research. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note, that the scope of the thesis has limited the amount of 
sources used, consequently only those deemed ‘most important’ were included, albeit 
others have been referenced.  
 
Further doctrinal research searching secondary authority was utilised in addition to 
‘black letter law’ as the latter may provide a too narrow understanding of law by only 
referencing primary sources. In addition, law reviews and other scholarly works were used 
so as to further the researchers understanding of the topic through explanation, analysis 
and commentary on the law. These sources further allow one to demonstrate in what ways 
CHAPTER II 
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the research undertaken relates to previous research, as well as underlining gaps in existing 
research. Moreover, the said secondary sources enable one to synthesise information 
obtained from ‘black letter law’ into a coherent legal theory and may present original 
theories that may be used to propose amendments to existing laws. Secondary authority 
was primarily found using the University of Glasgow’s library and legal databases such as 
LexisLibrary and HeinOnline. In order to find appropriate material, key words, such as 
‘transnational organised crime’ or ‘mutual legal assistance’, were used and abstracts 
evaluated so as to ascertain that the information provided complied with the researcher’s 
needs.   
 
Thereafter, socio-legal research was conducted to assure that the legal research was 
more detailed, constructive and comprehensive. In particular, within the field of 
international law, socio-legal research enables one to consider law in the context of 
broader social and political forces. This is of particular importance when studying 
transnational organised crime, as the latter constitutes a phenomenon, which takes different 
forms within and across different types of society. Accordingly, the conceptual and 
analytical material may be synthesised so as to propose alternatives for legal development. 
As with the doctrinal research, secondary sources including journal articles were used.  
 
Finally, comparative cross-jurisdictional research was applied so as to study the 
similarities and differences between two legal systems, namely the international legal 
system revolving around the United Nations (UN) and the legal system of the European 
Union. Comparing the aforementioned permits one to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding and consequently enables new legal ideas and conceptual solutions to be 
articulated. However, one must bear in mind that as an intergovernmental organisation and 
subject to international law, the EU is bound by international law, but the same is not 
applicable to the United Nations. Nevertheless, the international system may benefit from 
elements of the supranational legal framework established by the EU.  
 21 
CHAPTER III 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME 
 
 The term transnational organised crime may evoke images of cross-border crime or 
crime associated with criminal groups such as the Italian Mafia, Colombian cartels or the 
Japanese Yakuza. If one had to name a specific crime, so-called ‘traditional’ organised 
crimes such as drug trafficking or illicit trading in weapons may come to mind. However, 
this chapter aims to introduce the reader to key features of transnational organised crime. 
Included is a description of why transnational organised crime has risen to prominence in 
recent years, and become a potential security threat, and an outline of the categories of 
crime that fall within the realm of transnational organised crime.  
 
3.1. The rise of transnational organised crime 
	
 Transnational organized crime emerged at the beginning of the 20th century arising 
in ‘parallel to the development of economic regulation, protection, and social support 
initiated by the modern Welfare State, and to the development of international law’.8 TOC 
is primarily viewed as an occurrence arising from ‘consumers’ demand for products and 
services, which are unmet due to criminogenic government prohibitions and exercises’.9 
Early examples include the illegal sale of alcohol in the United States during the 
Prohibition Era or the control of territory by the Italian Mafia, which ‘encompasses all 
facets of the resident social community, with a particular emphasis on the local political 
powers and economic activity’.10  
 
Organised crime networks may rapidly take advantage of new developments in 
society as evident, for example, by the development of the illegal trade in organs and 
counterfeit medicines. The type of illegal goods and services provided, as well as the 
extent of the organised criminal groups’ involvement depends, ‘on the trends of the 
international illegal economy and the group’s capability to position themselves on the new 
routes’.11 Factors that promote the process by which criminal networks have acquired 
influence, and under the right circumstances even participated in the exercise of 
institutional power, have included: (i) the expansion of markets, in the absence of 
																																																						
8 Letizia Paoli, ‘The Paradoxes Of Organized Crime’ (2002) 37 Crime, Law & Social Change 51, 63. 
9 Alexander J Blenkinsopp, ‘Transnational Organized Crime, By Frank G. Madsen’ (2010) 11(3) Global 
Crime 366, 367. 
10 Europol, ‘Threat assessment. Italian organised crime’ (Europol 2013) 7. 
11 Paoli (n 8) 72. 
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safeguards and legal protection; (ii) transitions in the political structure of states formerly 
dominated by protectionism; (iii) the lack of norms and the absence of effective 
government structures in weak states and (iv) a lack of understanding for legality among 
the populace.12 As a result of globalisation, ‘‘criminogenic asymmetries’ between 
countries in terms of ‘structural discrepancies, mismatches and inequalities in the realms of 
the economy, law, politics and culture’’13 have expanded, providing new opportunities to 
organised criminal groups. Hence, in the 1990s, states felt that TOC no longer merely 
constituted a criminal law or criminological problem, but rather a security threat due to its 
ability to adapt and transform.14 
 
3.2. The securitisation of ‘transnational organised crime’ 
 
Although the effects of TOC on society may be merely viewed as negative 
consequences of criminal activity, its repercussions on individuals, the economy and the 
state can elicit a significant threat, which cannot be adequately dealt with under domestic 
policy.15 Under the right circumstances, organised crime may even pose a threat to the 
regional or international order due to its transnational nature. Consequently, the hitherto 
existing separation between internal and external security becomes increasingly blurred. 
TOC may become a matter of national security, resulting in the greater allocation of 
resources, ‘the creation of specific state entities, the alteration of police operations, and a 
deeper involvement of intelligence agencies’.16 The securitisation of transnational 
organised crime has become particularly apparent in states such as the Republic of Ireland, 
Mexico and the United States, and has resulted in the adaptation of legal frameworks and 
the acceptance of more militarised methods of policing.17 In the Republic of Ireland, 
securitisation has even culminated in the usage of counterterrorism approaches to address 
TOC, which have been justified by ‘reference to the rise in drugs and firearms offences, 
low detection and prosecution rates for gun homicides in particular, and because of the link 
between paramilitary actors and a burgeoning ‘gun culture’’.18 Nevertheless, it remains 
																																																						
12 Alison Jamieson, ‘Transnational Organized Crime: A European Perspective’ (2001) 24(5) Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 377. 
13 Klaus von Lampe, ‘Transnational organized crime challenges for future research’ (2012) 58 Crime Law 
Soc Change 179, 185. 
14 Liz Campbell, ‘Organized Crime and National Security: A Dubious Connection?’ (2014) 17(2) New Crim 
L Rev 220. 
15 Lars J Gerdes, ‘Die Bedrohung durch transnational organisierte Kriminalität’ in Thomas Jäger (ed), Die 
Komplexität der Kriege (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2010). 
16 Campbell (n 16) 221. 
17 ibid 225. 
18 ibid 226. 
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uncertain whether TOC, in general, may be regarded as an existential threat due to its 
defiance with the existence of the state, or through the seriousness and magnitude of the 
threat it presents to the community and to the conducting of a ‘normal life’. Both on 
domestic and international levels, the violence associated with TOCs, such as human 
trafficking, which currently is heavily debated within the European Union, is one of the 
most visible side effects, attracting media and public attention.19 However, it is important 
to note that the perception of the problem is not necessarily dependant of the actual overall 
threat posed by TOC: After all, human trafficking is more prominent in the British media, 
than drugs and fraud, the most profitable sectors of TOC.20 The securitisation of TOC and 
the false perception of the threat can initiate a moral panic, diverting political attention 
from the exercise and application of more coercive legislation. The ‘ultimate legal 
consequence would be a declaration of a state of emergency by the executive, and 
associated derogation from certain rights’.21 Accordingly, the securitisation of TOC has the 
ability to affect the capacity of courts to intercede in methods that are problematic in terms 
of procedural rights. Nevertheless, the rationalisation for legal exceptionalism in relation to 
national security pertains to state sovereignty, as the state may declare that it is justified in 
defending itself from the perceived threat.  
 
 In the 21st century, transnational organised crime appears increasingly on national 
and international security agendas. The securitisation of TOC may enhance international 
cooperation and result in the strengthening of the international legal framework to combat 
the threat. However, there is the potential risk that the legal measures and rules introduced 
to counter TOC may be misused to further political objectives and/or may result in 
individual rights being undermined.  
 
3.3. The contemporary manifestation of transnational organised crime 
 
 Nowadays, transnational organised crime is no longer viewed as an internal 
security threat, but rather as a threat to ‘peace and security, development and human rights, 
democracy and good governance’.22 TOC is able to endanger the sovereignty and 
independence of the nation in a particularly rapid and substantial way. This has become 
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particularly apparent in states like Colombia, where the state appears to have lost the 
‘capacity to manage by itself’.23 Moreover, large-scale financial fraud initiated in one state 
may rapidly precipitate a chain reaction, affecting various states in different ways and 
become exacerbated over a long period of time.24 When trying to tackle transnational 
organised crime, problems are intensified by the capacity of criminal groups to obscure 
their activities, to act swiftly to capitalise from new opportunities, and to adapt their 
structures and activities to law enforcement counter-measures. Furthermore, members of 
TOC groups may infiltrate states, ‘thereby obtaining not only intimate knowledge of their 
tactics and techniques, but also advance notice of any operations’.25 Criminal groups also 
may make ‘use of proxies and contractors at the operational level, allowing the proxies to 
incur the risks of detection and apprehension’.26 This specialisation makes it even more 
difficult to identify the players within a complex criminal network and hinders law 
enforcements attempts to break down these complex organisational structures.  
 
 While TOC may threaten the security of states, it often is viewed by citizens as a 
viable alternative as it provides a system of governance, services and products that the state 
does not, thereby remaining a favourable, albeit suboptimal, proxy.27 It has even been 
proposed that it is ‘the quintessential expression of the kind of private-sector 
entrepreneurialism celebrated and encouraged by the neoliberal economic orthodoxy’.28 
 
3.4. Transnational organised crimes 
 
 The crimes most commonly associated with TOC, which have received the most 
attention from politicians and policy-makers on an international level and in terms of law-
making are: drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling of migrants and the illicit 
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trading in firearms.29 However, the crimes associated with TOC have become increasingly 
transnational and diversified, manifesting themself in as many as fifty-two forms.30 The 
following section aims to provide an overview of those traditionally affiliated with TOC as 
well as emerging crimes of concern.  
 
 Drug trafficking is one of the largest global markets, ‘estimated at over $500 billion 
per year’.31 It typically involves the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of 
substances, which are subject to drug prohibition laws.32 It is commonly agreed upon that 
drug trafficking remains an evolving and harmful threat, which undermines governance 
and human security. In recent years, the ‘war on drugs’ has taken different approaches 
between those who promote criminal justice and security responses, versus those who 
pursue a framework that aims at reducing demand and harm.  
 
 Human trafficking constitutes not only a serious crime, and a grave violation of 
human rights, but also represents one of today’s largest shadow economies.33 Every year, 
thousands of individuals fall victim to exploitation, with the International Labor 
Organisation estimating that the number of trafficking victims amounts to approximately 
20.9 million people worldwide.34 Human trafficking is the only crime to fall under TOCs, 
which is classified as a crime against humanity. It manifests itself in many forms, with 
forced labour and sexual exploitation being the primary types. The scale of the problem is 
ascribed to the various roles states play in the exploitation of the victims, ‘whether that be 
recruiting, harbouring, transporting, or acting as destinations for victims’.35 Despite 
growing awareness about human trafficking, it remains underreported due it its covert 
nature, misapprehension about what it entails, and a lack of cognisance about its indicators.  
 
 The smuggling of migrants ‘occurs when migrants, prevented from entering a state 
because of heavily enforced restrictive immigration policies, turn to smugglers for 
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assistance to gain entry’.36 However, unlike with human trafficking, the smugglers’ 
motivations are primarily pecuniary, as they do not, usually, seek exploitation of those 
smuggled. Both push and pull factors induce individuals to leave their country, either 
because internal factors such as conflict or poverty require them to resort to smuggling 
services (push factors) or because destination countries are perceived to have greater 
economic opportunities or provide political stability (pull factors).37 
 
 Illicit trading in firearms kills at least 3,000 individuals daily according to the 
United Nations and takes place not merely for economic reasons, but may also be 
attributed to political and social motivations.38 Moreover, firearms’ trafficking is 
associated with armed violence, including ‘inter-state conflict, civil wars, terrorism, 
organised crime and gang warfare’.39 Nonetheless, despite an increase in humanitarian 
crises affiliated with violence brought about by firearms and an increase in arms trade, 
there is to date no comprehensive international legal framework governing the illicit 
trading in firearms. 
 
 In addition to the above mentioned crimes, numerous ‘new’ transnational organised 
crimes are emerging and were identified by the United Nations during the fifth Conference 
of Parties to the UNTOC in 2010 as issues to be addressed.40 Cybercrime, for example, has 
been recognised as threatening national and international prosperity, security and stability. 
Identity-related crime is also on the rise with organised criminal groups using the 
identification information not only to generate profit, but also to impact individuals, 
economies and online commerce. Moreover, trafficking in cultural property, such as 
excavated artefacts, is not only increasingly used to generate profits through the sale in 
underground illicit markets, but also to launder the proceeds of crime. 41  In addition to the 
above, organised crime groups have become involved in environmental crime, such as the 
trafficking of endangered species, piracy and organ trafficking.  
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 New practices and legal innovations need to the implemented in order to address all 
facets of transnational organised crime. Further, it is important to develop an integrated 
and comprehensive strategy that takes into account the fluid, globalised nature of criminal 
networks, as well as their sophisticated tactics.  
 28 
CHAPTER IV 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Having shown where the concept of transnational organised crime came from, why 
it came to dominate official discourse, and what crimes fall within its scope, we shall turn 
to transnational organised crime in international law. The following chapter will discuss 
how the complex phenomenon of TOC is defined in international law, what obligations 
states have under international law when addressing such a threat and what legal 
instruments have been implemented hitherto to tackle TOC.  
 
4.1. Defining transnational organised crime in international law 
 
 Transnational organised crime is a term not easily defined given that it incorporates 
various crimes and primarily describes a social phenomenon. TOC poses a challenge for 
almost any attempt at definition and/or regulation and as yet has not been delineated as a 
legal concept, as a precise judicial meaning is absent.42 The words ‘transnational’ and 
‘crime’ are more easily defined, however, the word ‘organised’ and how we interpret it 
poses numerous challenges as it refers to the ‘attributes of the criminal organisations that 
make the crimes they commit ‘organised’’.43 Notwithstanding, defining ‘transnational 
organised crime’ facilitates international criminal cooperation, as it tends to increase its 
effectiveness. Moreover, should the term be too loosely defined, measures to combat TOC 
may be ineffective or incompatible with the rules and principles of nation states, and might 
even become derogatory.44 ‘They vary from small, loosely connected networks, 
comprising a handful of persons, to large, hierarchical organisations’,45 such as the 
Colombian ‘drug cartels’ or the Chinese ‘triads’. That being said, if the definition is too 
restricted, changes in the development of TOC may not be accounted for. So, how is the 
term ‘organised’ to be understood? Ordinarily, it is either to be recognised as a set of 
actors, such as a group of three or more persons acting together, or a set of activities, such 
as drug or human trafficking. Given the various interpretations of the term, the legal 
treatment of and the affiliation with a criminal group, as well as the activities linked to 
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TOC, vary from state to state. An example of an institution oftentimes associated with 
TOC is the brothel: Strictly prohibited and punished in France, such establishments are 
perfectly legal in Belgium or Spain.46  
 
 The question remains: How is transnational organised crime defined in 
international law? The first definition of organised crime in international was established 
in the Joint Action 733 by the European Union in 1998.47 As with the majority of 
definitions to be found in international law, the scale and threat of TOC is highlighted 
while concomitantly imprecise definitions with no or few strict criteria are acceded to. As 
the German public prosecutor Peter Korneck once said: ‘If you omit the reference to 
‘serious offences’, you are left with the description of an activity that in Germany and in 
all the Western world is usually described as entrepreneurial activity’.48 As a result of the 
ambiguity surrounding the term, a ‘double track’ approach has been decided upon, which 
emphasises the scale and threat of TOC, whilst simultaneously endorsing minimum 
common denominator definitions, with no precise criteria.49 Yet, consequently, the term is 
often used interchangeably with, inter alia, professional crime, criminal enterprises, gangs 
or secret societies.50 However, listing all possible criminal activities exclusively associated 
with TOC is not an option either, as this would prejudice the applicability and 
effectiveness of the definition and would demand specific responses for each crime.51  
 
 Defining transnational organised in international law is a challenging task, as 
definitions and interpretations of the term vary considerably, and encompassing all crimes 
associated with TOC is almost impossible. Hence, presently, the UNTOC has established 
the most widely accepted definition of TOC (adhering to the ‘double track’ approach) 
whilst still not being entirely universal and unequivocal.  
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4.2. Obligations of states under international law 
 
International law lays down obligations which states are required to respect by 
becoming parties to international treaties. However, as Lambert opines: ‘general 
obligations are based on the premise that ‘international law imposes obligation not of way 
but of result’’.52  General obligations do not require states to legislate in order to perform 
their international obligations, but rather provide guidelines that state parties ought to 
follow in order to achieve a given objective and obligation. States are free to choose the 
ways and means of attaining these objectives and obligations.53 International law is made 
up of an autonomous set of international treaty norms and various sovereign sets of 
domestic criminal norms with distinguishing legal authorities. The increasing number and 
complexity of international treaty norms and their transmutation into domestic laws, 
enables better assimilation of domestic criminal laws into the international prohibition 
regime.54 Through the ratification of so-called suppression conventions, state parties’ agree 
to criminalise the unlawful behaviour specified in those conventions and to adopt mutual 
legal assistance and extradition provisions, which warrant cooperation with other states 
attempting to establish and exercise jurisdiction over those individuals accused of a 
crime.55 Moreover, conventions such as the UNTOC include the indirect suppression of 
crimes that have actual or potential transnational effects or transnational moral impacts, 
since state parties are required to criminalise certain forms of conduct and provide legal 
assistance to other state parties.  Accordingly, the transnational element in the definition of 
crime may be qualified as substantive and jurisdictional, as it implies that state parties are 
required to establish jurisdiction over extraterritorial activities.56 Suppression conventions, 
such as the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism or the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption,57 are said to have a twofold 
purpose: (i) substantive criminalisation and (ii) international cooperation in criminal 
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matters. Having ratified the international treaty, the state party obliges itself to implement 
and enforce said treaty on a national level as it is deemed to be the most effective unit to do 
so. As such, international treaties merely provide a normative outline given that such a 
large margin of appreciation is left to the state party as to undermine any claim to 
codification.58 There are two forms of transposition available to states: (i) ‘direct 
transposition’ of the treaty formulations of what ought to be criminalised and (ii) ‘indirect 
transposition’ of treaty provisions, ‘which involves the decoding of the essence of the 
norm to fit into the national legal system’s structures, principles and existing criminal 
laws’.59 Contrary to international criminal law there is no individual criminal responsibility 
under international law, the right to adjudicate remaining with the state.  
 
International law expands beyond treaty law. In international law, law-making 
authority is the central power to be claimed. This authority is primarily contended by 
states, ‘international organisations to the extent empowered by their respective mandates, 
and to a more limited extent, international courts and tribunals’.60 That being said, it is 
important to note that authority is not equal to legality. The former is thought to be the 
right to rule, whereas the latter is said to be the property of being legal.61 Although it can 
be difficult to establish law-making authority, there are various sources of law, some of 
which are reflected in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, from 
which international law derives it force: customary law, general principles of law, and so-
called hard and soft law62. These sources co-exist side-by-side in the international legal 
system. Consent is the foundation of international law and as such, more implicitly, the 
cornerstone of customary international law. Customary international law consists of ‘state 
practice arising out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris)’.63  However, given its 
premises, customary international law is said to be backward looking, can be difficult to 
prove and ‘vague and open to conflicting interpretations’.64 That being said, customary 
international law is the prime example that law can be ‘hard’ without being encapsulated in 
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a binding text.65 General principles primary function is to close gaps left by customary 
international law and hard law. These principles manifest themselves by comparing 
representative national legal systems, examples being the binding nature of agreements or 
the principles of procedural fairness before a court of law.66 Hard law instruments such as 
treaties and conventions refer to precise legally binding obligations that ‘delegate authority 
for interpreting and implementing the law’.67 Albeit these instruments providing more 
legal certainty, the pursuit of common endeavours through the usage of sources of ‘hard 
law’ is said to restrict actors’ behaviour and even their sovereignty. As a result, legal 
scholarship has been increasingly focusing on quasi-legal instruments that do not have any 
binding force, so called ‘soft law’ instruments. These instruments, such as the Financial 
Action Task Force’s (FATF) recommendations on money laundering, are becoming 
increasingly popular.68 Redo and Platzer argue, ‘the nonsignatory and non-ratifiable but 
binding character of soft law is determined on the basis of its two basis features: (a) 
objective – administration through state practice – and (b) subjective – a state’s belief 
(opinio juris) that the soft law is binding, as if indeed it were a signed and ratified law’.69 
Soft law is often viewed as easier to achieve, more flexible, reducing contracting and 
sovereignty costs, whilst being able to be combined with coercive name and shame tools to 
ensure implementation. Although these ‘soft law’ instruments do not have any legal 
binding force and states have no obligations under international law, they ‘allow states to 
be more ambitious and engage in ‘deeper’ cooperation than they would if they had to 
worry about enforcement’.70 Soft-law, with its greater flexibility, experimentation and 
deliberate dialogue, has the ability to become accepted and customary over time so as to be 
universally accepted. On the other hand, it enables hard law to be broadened, detailed and 
continuously developed. Conclusively, in the words of Shaffer and Pollack, ‘soft law, in 
this sense, represents a modern variant of ‘the law to be made’, lex feranda, which reflects 
the aspiration of law’s progressive development’.71 
 
 The state parties expressly and voluntarily accept all obligations, comprised within 
international treaties, unlike with customary international law. A minimum degree of 
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harmonisation and approximation of criminal law is induced; nevertheless each jurisdiction 
holds the right to implement the provisions according to its political, cultural and social 
traditions. Finally, concluding an international treaty does not prohibit regional and 
bilateral agreements. ‘Rather, these three levels should operate in a complementary way, 
creating a global ‘net’ or ‘web’’ to obstruct crime.72  
 
4.3. The main international instruments in the fight against transnational organised 
crime 
 
‘Just as organised crime could not exist without international cooperation, the only 
possibility of combating contemporary organised crime is through international 
cooperation.’73 
- Rodrigo Paris-Steffens 
 
The internationalisation of criminal laws and prohibition policies, which oftentimes 
have been ascribed to the economic and security interests of the dominant world powers, as 
well as to persuasive moral interests, have brought transnational organised crime to the 
forefront of international cooperation.74 Since its formation in the 1940s, the United 
Nations has been a leading entity of the so-called ‘internationalisation of rule of law’, i.e. 
the development of international law. Even it its early days, its mandate included the fight 
against transnational organised crime, with action stemming from article 1 of the UN 
Charter and articles 28 and 29 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.75 The 
latter prohibits slavery and the slave trade in ‘all their forms’, which is closely linked to the 
‘modern-day slave trade’ of human trafficking. In order to promote international 
cooperation and to ‘harmonise’ national crime legislation in the field of TOC, the United 
Nations have administered three international legal instruments to counter drug trafficking, 
transnational organised crime and corruption. ‘Each of these conventions sets forth 
mandatory obligations for the parties to criminalise offences, establish jurisdiction, provide 
fair treatment and to implement law enforcement devices of aut dedere aut judicare and 
mutual legal assistance’.76 
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Three main drug control conventions have been drafted by the United Nations: the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. The first 
significant attempt to harmonise drug related offences and provide for procedural 
cooperation stems from the international rejection of the Indo-Chinese opium trade. 
Negative reactions to the opium wars in the 19th century and the growing opium trade 
strengthened support for the anti-opium lobbies in Europe and the United States.77 The 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs had three core objectives: (i) to limit the production 
of raw materials; (ii) to codify the existing conventions into a single multilateral 
convention and (iii) to simplify the existing drug control machinery.78 While codifying 
various previous regulations into a single convention, the Single Convention marked a shift 
from a system whose primary interest was ‘restrictive commodity agreements’ to a more 
stringent and wider ranging multilateral framework which became more prohibitive in 
nature.79 Just 10 years later, the convention was followed by the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, which came about as a result of a growing concern for the 
diversification and expansion of the spectrum of drugs and the harmful effects of synthetic 
drugs. With drug trafficking increasing in the 1980s, the 1988 Convention was designed to 
respond to the growth in trafficking, since the earlier instruments did not deal with the 
issue in an adequate manner. As a result, the convention does not only criminalise drug-
related offences, but makes ‘such offenses the basis for international extradition between 
party states, and provid[es] for mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution 
of covered offenses, as well as the seizure and confiscation of proceeds from and 
instrumentalities used in illicit trafficking activities’.80 Moreover, the previous conventions 
merely required application of criminal policy measures to the supply side, whilst the 1988 
devotes article 3(2) to the individual drug user.81 As such, the 1988 Convention has 
become one of the most detailed and far-reaching instruments adopted in the field of 
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international law with its success resulting in a push for a global multilateral treaty to 
suppress transnational organised crime. 
 
 Member states of the United Nations agreed that a more effective international 
instrument was required in order to suppress transnational organised crime. They identified 
the need for more effective international cooperation, particularly in relation to four 
matters: (i) closer alignment of legislative instruments; (ii) strengthening of international 
cooperation in criminal matters; (iii) establishment of modalities and basic principles for 
international cooperation and (iv) ‘measures and strategies to prevent and combat money-
laundering and to control the use of proceeds of crime’.82 In order to address the above 
mentioned, the United Nations implemented the first comprehensive and legally binding 
instrument to fight TOC in 2000, the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime, which is further supplemented by three protocols. The convention 
focuses on four main areas: criminalisation, international cooperation, technical 
cooperation and implementation; whilst establishing four offences: participation in an 
organised criminal group, money laundering, corruption, and obstruction of justice.83 
Given that the UNTOC is at the heart of this thesis, the above information merely serves as 
an introduction and will be further elaborated upon in Chapter V.  
 
The final international legal instrument discussed is the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, signed in 2003, which aims to promote and strengthen measures to 
prevent and combat corruption; to promote, facilitate and support international cooperation 
and to promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and 
property.84 In order to achieve the said aims, the UNCAC focuses on preventive measures, 
criminalisation, international cooperation and asset recovery. The provisions relating to 
prevention concern themselves with the prevention of corruption in the judiciary and 
public procurement, as well as the establishment of anti-corruption bodies. Moreover, in 
addition to criminalising basic forms of corruption, such as bribery and embezzlement, 
trading in influence and the concealment and laundering of proceeds of crime are also 
criminalised. Provisions of international cooperation require states to cooperate in the 
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realms of prevention, investigation and prosecution.85 The UNCAC is novel in that it 
criminalises corruption in its wider meaning, including both the supply and demand side, 
as well as listing numerous offences (albeit one must note that the sanctions attached to 
each offence are far from exhaustive) and revolutionising the realm of asset recovery.  
 
As can be seen from the above, the United Nations have implemented a series of 
conventions that have created a system for state parties to deal with transnational organised 
crime. While these treaties may be seen as important milestones in the fight against TOC, 
one must not forget that these treaties, with exception of the UNTOC, remain subject 
specific and therefore have limited applicability. That being said, all of these treaties 
hinder a concerted response as these attempt to prosecute TOC with, to a large extent, non-
binding and vaguely worded obligations, which are not adequately implemented due to the 
lack of effective implementation mechanisms. State parties to multiple instruments may 
also find it difficult to adhere to all obligations. Further, these instruments do not 
necessarily meet the requirements to address new forms of crimes or the interplay between 
TOC and political power. In addition to the above, efforts are undermined by the principle 
of state sovereignty and political interference, resulting in a lack of cooperation. Hence, it 
is important to reflect upon these treaties, evaluate whether they are suited to combat TOC 
in today’s globalised world and suggest ways of strengthening the international system.  
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CHAPTER V 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FIGHTING 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME 
 
5.1. The United Nations’ Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
 
 The United Nations’ Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, also 
known as Palermo Convention, was adopted by the General Assembly (GA) in 2000 and 
came into force in 200386. The convention is further supplemented by the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
entered into force in December 2003; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air, entered into force in January 2004; and the Protocol against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition, entered into force in July 2005.87 As of May 2015, the convention has 185 
state parties that have agreed to adhere to the forty-one articles that require them to 
criminalise certain activities, to endorse measures for the prosecution of offenders and for 
the confiscation and seizure of, inter alia, the proceeds of crime.88 
 
Much of the scholarly research on the UNTOC is directed to the exploration of the 
criminalisation dimension, rather than the detailed and elaborate procedural dimension, the 
latter being ‘concerned with the articulation of inter-state cooperation in pursuit of the 
alleged criminal’.89 However, the extensive procedural dimension suggests that 
international criminal cooperation is the essence of the UNTOC. Interestingly, scholars 
such as Boister contend that the ‘coupling of a highly tractable definition of transnational 
organised crime to the detailed legal provisions for cooperation in the UNTOC has 
worked, at least so far, to the convention’s disadvantage as an instrument for 
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cooperation’.90 As such, rather than providing an extensive definition of TOC, the 
convention functions as a ‘tool box’ to facilitate various types of international cooperation.  
Other scholars, such as Verbruggen, maintain that the there is no need for a comprehensive 
definition resulting in harmonisation, instead only a certain level of standardisation needs 
to be achieved to effectively tackle TOC.91 Indeed, the definition embodied in the 
convention allows for a broad application, encompassing a majority of cross-border, profit-
driven serious offences. The definition takes into account the complexity of TOC and 
allows for cooperation regarding a variety of common concerns. Further, the UNTOC’s 
broad definition, ‘alongside other provisions of the Convention, serves the utilitarian 
purpose of accommodating the provisions dealing with extradition, mutual legal assistance 
and police co-operation’.92 Hence, the convention serves as a tool box on modes for 
international cooperation rather than providing a more sophisticated concept of TOC as 
long as the crimes in question are ‘serious’ and present a cross-border element.  
 
Much of the UNTOC’s content has been derived from existing international 
instruments, such as the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, from which 15 operative articles are derived in whole or in 
part.93 Moreover, the convention’s content is similar to existing regional texts or bilateral 
treaties in some cases, which may cause implementation problems as provisions may not 
have been designed to complement each other. For example, the Firearms Protocol is 
similar to the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other related material (CIFTA) of 
1997, albeit the latter being wider in scope.94 Interestingly, rather than incorporating a lot 
of innovative articles, such as article 10 on criminal liability of legal persons and articles 
12 to 14 on asset recovery, the UNTOC seldom engages in issues in which states had 
different approaches, conspiracy and modes of participation as an accomplice being 
exceptions.95 Further, in order to establish a far-reaching convention, a wide measure of 
discretion is granted to state parties, rather than mandatory requirements expressed in the 
words ‘a state party shall’. 
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The aim of the UNTOC is to promote cooperation to prevent and combat 
transnational organised crime more effectively and ‘fight organised crime as a method or a 
process for the commission of serious offences, regardless of its concrete manifestations’.96 
It is a multidisciplinary instrument, which goes beyond the traditional areas of international 
criminal cooperation, such as law-enforcement cooperation, incorporating, for example, 
witness protection programmes and envisaging the role of civil society. 97 The convention 
sets forth objectives and discusses areas of mutual concern, whilst leaving it to state parties 
to determine how and to what extent the said objectives should be achieved.   
 
5.1.1. Defining transnational organised crime 
 
 Defining transnational organised crime constituted a major obstacle during the 
negotiations of the UNTOC, as ‘there continued to be divergences of a legal nature that 
made it difficult to reach a comprehensive definition’.98 This resulted in the development 
of a definition of ‘organised criminal group’ (OCG) rather than TOC, as there was a 
general understanding of the distinguishing features of an OCG. The definition in article 
2(a) sets forth that the distinguishing feature of an OCG ‘is not the crime committed, nor 
the type of criminal, but the process by which it is carried out’.99 The convention defines 
an organised criminal groups as ‘a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a 
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes 
or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or material benefit’.100 Therefore, as there is no definition of 
transnational organised crime per se, the UNTOC’s subject matter is organised criminal 
groups that are involved in ‘serious crime’. The latter offence is punishable by a maximum 
penalty of incarceration for a period of four years or more. Serious crimes are not limited 
to those criminalised in the UNTOC under articles 5, 6, 8, and 23, member states are free 
to adopt their own lists subject to the criminal penalty associated with the crime. Jennifer 
Smith notes that ‘because domestic laws, and not international standards, determine this 
aspect of the definition, some states may change the penalties in their domestic criminal 
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statutes to remove crime from the scope of the Convention’, 101 leaving room for the 
possibility of abuse. Further, a ‘‘structured group’ does not need have formally defined 
roles for its members, continuity of membership or a developed structure, but it can be 
randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence’.102 In order for the 
definition not to impede with the definition of conspiracy to be found in common law 
countries, where two people may be guilty of said act, a larger group is required.103 This 
definition enables the convention to be applied to a variety of networks, including new 
manifestations of OCGs, ensuring its continued relevance.104 That being said, as the 
breadth of the definition does not specifically target high-end, large-scale organisations, it 
also creates the ‘potential for over-condemning low-end, small-scale organisations’.105 
Moreover, any such group must exist for a period of time and as such single, ad hoc 
operations are excluded. Therefore, ‘organised crime is characterised by criminal activities 
that are carried out on a sustained, repeated basis’.106 However, the UNTOC does not 
specify the duration of the ‘period of time’. The fact that the criminal activity must serve 
financial or material gain excludes terrorism (except potentially its financing). 
Furthermore, the Travaux Préparatoires note that ‘other material benefit’ may also include 
non-material gratification such as sexual services.107 On the whole, the definition remains 
rather superficial, following the ‘double track’ approach, but its strength is that it can be 
applied to a diversity of legal systems and reconciles various political interests on TOC.  
 
5.1.2. Offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8, and 23 
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 State parties to the convention have committed to establishing the criminal offences 
of participation in an organised criminal group, the laundering of proceeds, corruption and 
obstruction of justice within their domestic legislation. 
 
5.1.2.1. Criminalisation of participation in an organised criminal group (Article 5) 
 
Article 5 of the UNTOC criminalises the participation in an organised criminal 
group and can be seen as ‘the result of a negotiation in which the ways in which different 
legal systems approach group criminality were brought together, at the same time with the 
appreciation that it was not a question of choosing one over the others, but of attaining a 
functional synthesis’.108 It requires state parties to establish one of two criminal offences: 
(i) one regarding agreement with other individuals to commit a serious crime to obtain a 
material benefit involving an organised criminal group, or (ii) taking an active part in 
criminal activities of the organised criminal group or in other activities of said group in the 
knowledge that participation, i.e. taking an active part, in said activity will contribute to the 
achievement of the criminal goal. Whether that implies that the accused has knowledge 
about the broader nature of the group is left to domestic law.109 The other offence being 
that of ‘organising, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of 
serious crime involving an organised criminal group’.110 These two criminal offences are 
not to be viewed as mutually exclusive, as state parties may implement both offences 
concurrently. However, ‘the only problem which might emerge is the situation where State 
Parties would choose not to incriminate ‘criminal agreement’ […], leaving agreement of 
two persons on commitment of serious crime uncovered’,111 resulting in the UNTOC being 
internally inconsistent.  
 
Paragraph 1 highlights the requirement that criminal offences be established in 
accordance with domestic law, suggesting that if a distinction is inferred in a particular 
legal system between regulatory infractions and criminal offences, the latter must be 
used.112 With regard to the mens rea, states must prove that the offence was committed 
intentionally. Nevertheless, it is at the state party’s discretion to decide whether reckless or 
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negligent behaviour ought to be punishable, or even enforce a ‘strict liability without proof 
of any fault element’.113 The offence laid out in paragraph 1(a)(i) is based on the offence of 
conspiracy which is usually found in common law countries, and must involve the 
commission of a serious crime, i.e. crime penalised by four years or more of deprivation of 
liberty. Prosecuting conspiracy is beneficial insofar that it serves to prevent TOC, allowing 
enforcement agencies to intervene in advance and enabling the prosecution of multiple 
persons, including those ‘who organise and plan crime, rather than execute it’.114 However, 
in most jurisdictions, conspiracy charges require proof of an overt act, making prosecution 
of high-ranking members more difficult. Moreover, prosecuting conspiracy fails to account 
for the specific danger presented by an OCG. ‘The difficulty that civil law states have with 
the common law principle of conspiracy accounts for the option to proscribe involvement 
in an organised criminal groups in terms of article 5(1)(a)(ii)’.115 As such it is important 
that the individual take an active part in the commission of the offence, which raises the 
question whether a more passive role such as a look-out man would amount to such an 
active part. Nevertheless, individuals can be held liable under this paragraph for 
involvement in activities that contribute to the criminal aim, without these activities being 
criminal in themselves.116 Hence, it enables the prosecution of so-called facilitators of 
TOC. Paragraph 1(b) requires the criminalisation of different forms of passive 
participation; the actual contribution and mens rea are subject to domestic interpretation. It 
is important to note that the acts of ‘organising’ and ‘directing’ are not commonly found in 
national jurisdictions and they are an innovation brought about by the UNTOC allowing 
for the prosecution of leaders of organised criminal groups. With regards as paragraph 
1(b), there is no indication as to whether proof is required that the serious crime in question 
has been executed or whether it also applies to the planning stage. Paragraph 2 refers to, 
inter alia, the mens rea and invokes that it ‘may be inferred from objective factual 
circumstances’.117 Given that an individual’s mind cannot be subject of direct evidence, 
unless a confession takes place, the court should be able to infer the knowledge or intent 
from the facts presented to it. Moreover, proof of negligence is not sufficient for a 
conviction, since many state parties would be unable to accept a negligence basis for 
criminal liability as a binding convention obligation.118 Finally, paragraph 3 demonstrates 
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the problem of formulating international rules to concur with differing national laws. 
Article 5 constitutes an attempt to criminalise organised criminal activity with respect to 
the various legal traditions, broadening criminal liability beyond preparatory offences and 
secondary participation. That being said, for many state parties it was not necessary for 
them to amend their legislation and as such ‘the question whether the concept of an OCG 
used by the UNTOC is actually suitable for realising the hope that attacks on 
organisation/logistics through the ‘double strategy’ will produce greater crime reduction’ 
remains unanswered.119 
 
5.1.2.2. Criminalisation of the laundering of proceeds of crime (Article 6) 
 
Article 6 of the UNTOC requires the criminalisation, in accordance with 
fundamental principles, of the laundering of proceeds of crime, ‘a special kind of ancillary 
or derivative offence, distinct from but predicate upon the crime that produces the money, 
the predicative offence’.120 This provision represents the first time that state parties are 
required ‘to expand the reach of their laundering laws to predicate offences associated with 
organised criminal activities other than those related to narcotics trafficking’.121 According 
to the convention, the terms ‘proceeds of crime’ and ‘money laundering’ are to be used 
interchangeably. State parties agree to criminalise the following activities when committed 
intentionally: ‘conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the 
proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin’,122 as well 
as ‘the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement 
or ownership of or rights with respect to property, knowing that such property is the 
proceeds of crime’.123 Both the individual who does the conversion or transfer may be held 
criminally responsible, as well as the person who aids the perpetrator of a criminal offence 
to evade detection by converting, transferring or disguising the property. Interestingly, it 
does not appear necessary that the accused know exactly what predicate offence had been 
committed, whereas the mens rea of the laundering proceed indicates that the latter cannot 
be committed by mistake.124 This raises the ‘wider issue as to the relationship between the 
																																																						
119 Boister (n 99) 141. 
120 Boister (n 7) 103. 
121 Colin L Powell, ‘U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Senate Consideration of 
Treaty Document 108-16’ (Library of Congress 2003-2004) <https://www.congress.gov/treaty-
document/108th-congress/16/document-text?overview=closed> accessed 18 July 2016. 
122 Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 
September 2003) 2225 UNTS 209. 
123 Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 
September 2003) 2225 UNTS 209. 
124 Boister (n 99). 
CHAPTER V 
	
44 
laundering offence and the predicate offence’.125 When referring to the conversion of 
property, it is important to note that the meaning of said term may vary in different legal 
systems and may be viewed as broad enough to encompass various acts. Paragraph 1(b) 
may be understood to serve as a safeguard clause, given that the crime of conspiracy may 
not be recognised by all state parties, thus a mere agreement to act cannot be criminalising. 
Further, paragraph 1(b)(ii) protects those individuals who, e.g. innocently receive the 
proceeds of crime as a gift, setting forth that the recipient must know ‘at the time of 
receipt’ that the property is the proceeds of crime.126 However, one must note that the 
‘notion of ‘receipt’ of an intangible has a degree of artificiality, and its meaning may vary 
with the legal system and the nature of property’.127 Paragraph 2(c) imposes a requirement 
of double criminality, i.e. that the conduct in question be considered a criminal offence in 
both the requesting and the requested state.  Moreover, paragraph 2(c) strives to bring forth 
a ‘model for national law reform by requiring parties to take jurisdiction over accessory 
offences when the predicate offence occurs extraterritorially subject to two conditions’.128 
Finally, paragraph 2(e) refers to ‘fundamental principles of the domestic law of a State 
Party’,129 which seemingly alludes to the concept of double jeopardy which prohibits the 
same act being subject of two different offences. 
 
The provision contained in the convention, allows for a wide degree of variation 
regarding implementation in national jurisdiction ‘through the inclusion of implicit and 
explicit ambiguous terms and optional clauses’.130 Article 6 could be strengthened, 
resulting in greater convergence and less risk for over criminalisation, if it contained 
greater detail about the acts associated with laundering, the scope of the predicate offence, 
the subjective and mental elements of the criminal activities, whilst also taking into 
account ‘self-laundering’.131 Further, it is worth mentioning that article 7 of the UNTOC 
sets forth measures to combat money-laundering and closely reflects the FATF’s 
recommendations, which reflect internationally endorsed global standards against the 
aforementioned crime. That being said, the FATF’s ‘soft law’ recommendations have been 
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converted into lighter, legally binding obligations in the UNTOC that achieve ‘hard law’ 
status.132 
 
  
																																																						
132Arnold Jose Alves Silveira, ‘The International Standards on Combatting Money Laundering: a Brazilian 
Perspective’ (The George Washington University 2009) 
<https://www.gwu.edu/~ibi/minerva/Spring2009/Arnaldo.pdf> accessed 20 July 2016. 
CHAPTER V 
	
46 
5.1.2.3. Criminalisation of corruption (Article 8) 
 
Article 8 criminalises corruption, requiring state parties to establish the offences of 
active and passive bribery, along with the participation as an accomplice in such an 
offence. Interestingly, the terms active and passive are not entirely adequate, as an 
individual may actively solicit bribes, thus ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side’ corruption is 
more appropriate.133 The UNTOC does not introduce a definition of corruption per se but 
criminalises various forms of corruption. Regarding active bribery, the promise of 
something is enough for the provisions to become applicable and ‘the route by which the 
advantage is to be passed may be indirect’.134 Moreover, bribery involving a foreign public 
official or international civil servant is also addressed by article 8, however it only requires 
states to consider criminalising the said offence. Subsequently, article 16(1) of the 
UNCAC made it mandatory for state parties to criminalise active bribery of the 
aforementioned individuals, 135 but passive bribery still remains in the weak ‘consider’ 
form. Moreover, with regards to ‘public officials’ a large margin of appreciation is left to 
state parties, whereas the corresponding definition in the UNCAC (article 2(a)) is much 
more comprehensive, specifying what a public official entails.136 Another notable omission 
is the failure to address bribery in the private sector, which oftentimes falls outside the 
domain of law enforcement and judicial institutions. In particular in financial, gambling 
and real estate industries, private sector corruption is playing an increasingly important 
role as it provides avenues for money laundering.137  
 
One may conclude that the UNTOC recognises that corruption has a key role in 
transnational organised crime, given that criminal groups make use of corruption in order 
to create or exploit opportunities and to shield operations. Corruption must be dealt with in 
order to effectively combat crimes falling within the UNTOC’s framework. The UNTOC 
may be seen as a building block toward a more comprehensive instrument addressing 
corruption, the UNCAC.   
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5.1.2.4. Criminalisation of obstruction of justice (Article 23) 
 
Article 23 criminalises obstruction of justice, an offence aimed at preventing 
criminal groups from interfering with the administration of justice and consequently 
avoiding investigation and prosecution, which has not been included in previous 
suppression conventions.138 This article establishes the following two criminal offences: (i) 
‘The use of physical force, threats or intimidation or the promise, offering or giving of an 
undue advantage to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the 
production of evidence in a proceeding in relation to the commission of offences covered 
by this Convention’;139 and (ii) ‘The use of physical force, threats or intimidation to 
interfere with the exercise of official duties by a justice or law enforcement official in 
relation to the commission of offences covered by this Convention’.140 Article 23 is not 
comprehensive. It does not include, for example, the tampering or destruction of evidence. 
Further, ‘no mode of responsibility other than commission is specified in relation to the 
offence’.141 Both corrupt means, such as bribery, and coercive means, such as the use of 
threat or violence, are covered. The term ‘proceedings’ must be widely interpreted as it 
intends to cover all governmental proceedings, including pre-trial processes.142 However, it 
appears as if the article does not apply to private proceedings. Further, there is no 
definition of the term ‘intimidation’, generally assumed to mean to make fearful or to put 
into fear, raising the questions as to what conduct constitutes intimidation and whether 
proof of such a mental state is required? One can argue that article 23 was implemented in 
order to prevent criminal groups from seeking to undermine systems of justice, 
complementing the provisions dealing with corruption, protection of witnesses and victims 
and internal cooperation.  
 
5.1.3. International criminal cooperation 
	
 The UNTOC provides for obligations on parties to provide each other cooperation 
in regards to matters such as extradition, mutual legal assistance, law-enforcement 
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cooperation and seizure and assets obtained by their commission.143 Provisions concerning 
international criminal cooperation enable or oblige states to establish territorial as well as 
extraterritorial jurisdiction with the aim of ‘increasing the efficiency of domestic 
prosecution of these transnational crimes’.144 The convention expands upon traditional 
means of international cooperation such as extradition and mutual legal assistance, 
including in the provisions details which ‘make it possible to establish the involvement of 
an organised criminal group and the transnationality of its activities – the triggers for the 
application of this cooperation regime’.145 Although the key feature of the convention is 
cooperation in criminal matters, the UNTOC also contains provisions, which aim to 
facilitate and promote international cooperation in other ways. For instance, the convention 
lists the ‘kind of assistance to be provided, the rights of the requesting and requested States 
relative to the scope and manner of cooperation, the rights of alleged offenders and the 
procedures to be followed in making and executing requests’.146 Further, the UNTOC has 
simplified the requirements for international criminal cooperation. Regardless of the 
improvements implemented, the cooperation regime still heavily relies upon existing 
systems for cooperation between state parties.  
 
5.1.3.1. Extradition (Article 16) 
 
 In a globalised world, offenders may seek safe havens as a way of escaping 
prosecution and justice. In order to bring them to justice, extradition proceedings are 
initiated, which are considered ‘a formal and, most frequently, a treaty-based process, 
leading to the return or delivery of fugitives to the jurisdiction in which they are 
wanted’.147 The UNTOC sets minimum standards for extradition and supports the adoption 
of a variety of mechanisms devised to streamline the extradition process ‘by eliminating 
the assertion that surrender may not be granted because the requesting and requested states 
do not have an extradition treaty between them’.148 In certain situations, state parties rely 
on the UNTOC as an extradition treaty, as exemplified by the (still ongoing) 2012 case of 
the United States trying to extradite ‘the alleged cybercriminal Kim Dotcom from New 
Zealand to the US to face copyright infringement, racketeering and money laundering 
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charges, crimes not listed in the 1970 extradition treaty between the two states, but 
something enabled by the recognition in section 101B(1) of the New Zealand Extradition 
Act 1999 of participation in an OCG committing serious transnational crimes’.149 Further, 
being able to use the international conventions as basis for extradition may reduce 
‘disguised extradition’, which has been rightfully condemned as a violation of international 
comity and international law.150 
 
 Pursuant to article 16, a state party shall, contingent on relevant conditions, such as 
double criminality, make extradition arrangements for an individual who is the subject of a 
request for extradition and is located in its territory for offences covered by the suppression 
convention that are transnational in nature and involve an organised criminal group. The 
double criminality requirement ought to be satisfied with regards to articles 6, 8 and 23 of 
the UNTOC given that state parties are required to criminalise said conduct. Concerning 
article 5 or serious crime, no obligation to extradite ensues unless the double criminality 
requirement is satisfied. Paragraph 2 aims to ameliorate extradition procedures, giving the 
requested state the possibility to deal with all alleged offences under the same procedure. 
However, the said paragraph does not intend to broaden the scope, but merely serves to 
facilitate the procedure.151 Provided that no state is required to extradite to another in the 
absence of an applicable treaty under international law, state parties may agree, under 
paragraph 4, to use the UNTOC as basis for extradition. According to research conducted 
by McClean, 21 state parties have asserted that they will use the convention as a basis for 
extradition.152 However, states have been reluctant to rely on the UNTOC as a basis for 
extradition, given that the convention’s provisions ‘are easily distinguishable [from 
bilateral agreements] when it comes to the level of detail in extradition treaties’.153 
Paragraph 7 stresses that extradition rests on the conditions and exceptions in a state’s 
domestic law as well as pertinent extradition treaties. The reference to the minimum 
penalty required under paragraph 7 was novel. Consequently, extraditable offences are 
nowadays often considered in terms of severity of punishment. State parties are required to 
execute more expeditious procedures and to simplify prima facie case requirements. Even 
so, it is important that state parties do not undermine a defendant’s fundamental legal 
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rights. Moreover, with regards to the evidentiary requirements, a barrier to effective 
cooperation, in particular for civil law jurisdictions, is the satisfaction of prima facie 
requirements. Article 16, paragraph 10, provides that the aut dedere aut judicare principle 
be applied should a state be unwilling to extradite the alleged offender. In such cases, the 
mutual legal assistance mechanisms set out in article 18 of the UNTOC are of particular 
importance. Optionally, state parties may opt to temporarily surrender the offender subject 
to conditions determined by the state parties in questions. These could, inter alia, include 
‘time limits on the commencement of proceedings in the requesting state, the availability 
of lawyers from the requested state, and the circumstances and conditions of provisional 
custody’.154  The only ‘human rights provision’ is to be found in paragraph 13, requiring 
state parties to provide fair treatment during extradition proceedings. One may assume that 
said principle is particularly important when it comes to the movement of individuals 
between jurisdictions.  
 
 Extradition, as laid out in article 16 of the UNTOC, obliges state parties to extradite 
individuals found within the territory for the offences established in accordance with 
articles 6, 8 and 23. Yet, this suppression convention provides limited guidance on the 
procedure for extradition. Whilst obstacles to extradition are removed, the pursuit of 
offenders remains difficult given that extradition remains a form of international relations.   
 
5.1.3.2. Mutual legal assistance (Article 18) 
 
 Mutual legal assistance (MLA) in criminal matters sees to the mechanisms for legal 
assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings, but does not commonly 
include mutual assistance between administrative authorities.155 When MLA is sought, as 
under customary international law, judicial authorities cannot enact investigative acts 
extraterritorially, as this would constitute a transgression of sovereignty. 156 Article 18 of 
the UNTOC provides a minimum standard for mutual legal assistance to be applied in the 
absence of a mutual legal assistance treaty with another state party. However, the said 
article ‘does not eliminate the material and procedural obstacles that mutual legal 
assistance faces, because it does not compel major changes in domestic law and 
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practice’.157  This is so, because the UNTOC preserves the diversity of national legal 
systems, allowing states to refuse MLA under certain conditions, so as to, inter alia, obtain 
a maximum number of states, which have ratified the convention.  
 
 According to paragraph 1 of article 18, state parties are obliged to make provisions 
for the widest measure of MLA with respect to investigations, prosecutions and judicial 
proceedings. The term ‘proceedings’ is not defined within the convention. The extent to 
which state parties will impart assistance is left to their discretion. Moreover, state parties 
are obliged to award each other assistance ‘on a reciprocal basis’ with reference to cases 
that are not self-evident but the ‘requesting state party has reasonable grounds to suspect 
that they exist’.158 The aim of lowering the evidentiary standards is to facilitate assistance 
requests which in turn helps to decide whether elements of transnationality and organised 
crime are present and whether MLA may be sought under the convention. Paragraph 2 
extends criminal liability to ‘legal persons’, a concept to be found within common law 
countries. Nonetheless, as pointed out by McClean: ‘in other countries, criminal liability is 
thought inappropriate because of the difficulty of applying some of the familiar concepts 
such as deterrence to a corporate body as distinct from its members’.159  The provision of 
various sources of legal authority such as, inter alia, ‘taking evidence or statements from 
persons’,160 ‘providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations’161 and 
‘providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records’162, are provided 
for in paragraph 3. The taking of evidence is limited in scope, as it merely applies to 
testimony as against ‘real evidence’, meaning objects of evidential value such as weapons 
used to commit a crime. So far as the latter are concerned, their supplying is unproblematic 
as long as the competent authorities in the requested state are in possession of said 
evidence. If they are not, permission from the owner or seizure must be sought, the supply 
of information being contingent on paragraphs 19 and 29 of article 18. With reference to 
the provision of relevant documents and records, acquisition may not be possible in some 
state parties unless criminal proceedings have been initiated.163 Article 18, paragraph 8, 
applies whether or not there is a binding general mutual legal assistance treaty between the 
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state parties, contending that mutual legal assistance must not be refused on the grounds of 
bank secrecy. 
 
Paragraphs 9-29 enumerate certain procedures and mechanisms that must be 
applied in the absence of a MLA treaty between the state parties concerned. According to 
paragraph 9, the requested state party has complete discretion in cases where there is no 
double criminality and is able to refuse, or grant in whole or in part, assistance. With 
respect to paragraph 10, one must note that the expression ‘being detained or […] serving a 
sentence’164 does not exclusively apply to prisoners, but also those individuals subject to, 
inter alia, community service, or house arrest. Regarding the transfer of detained or 
convicted persons to another state party (see paragraph 10(b)), ‘state parties may agree that 
the requested state party may be present at witness testimony conducted in the territory of 
the requesting state’,165 presumably to assure no violations of human or procedural rights 
are committed. Moreover, paragraph 13 of article 18 of the convention ‘requires the 
designation of a central authority with the power to receive and execute or transmit mutual 
legal assistance requests to the competent authorities to handle it in each State party’.166 
That being said, the UNTOC does not intend to bring about a limitation to states having a 
central authority as regards receiving requests or to a different central authority concerning 
making requests. Using a central authority is preferred; nonetheless, diplomatic channels 
may be used, which, inevitably, leads to delays. The minimum contents of the request are 
laid out in paragraph 15, emphasising that the evidence of information provided to the 
requesting state by the requested state must be admissible or useable for the former. 
Nevertheless, no prescribed form has been suggested or implemented given that requests 
are likely to be so manifold that such a form would be disadvantageous. It is important to 
note that subject to paragraph 19, the requesting state is prohibited from using information 
or evidence furnished by the requested state unless it has been explicitly stated in the 
request. However, with the consent of the requested state party the said information or 
evidence may be used, after all ‘it would be unhelpful to have a convention rule forbidding 
the wider use of material automatically and in every case’.167 Flowing on from paragraph 
23, paragraph 26 indirectly suggests that a state party unable to provide assistance shall 
‘explore with the requesting state party whether the desired result, or some part of it, can 
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be achieved in some other way’168 given that negotiations may bring forth alternative 
measures. The final paragraph, paragraph 30, encourages the conclusion of new bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or arrangements in order to aid the article’s implementation as well 
as strengthening its provisions. Article 18 improves mutual legal assistance through the 
establishment of central authorities, as well as the inclusion of new possibilities for 
enabling investigations through the transmission of information and evidence. Further, the 
UNTOC places greater emphasis on liaison and consultation than previous instruments.  
 
5.1.3.3. Law-enforcement cooperation (Article 27) 
 
 In comparison with the forms of cooperation established under article 18, article 27 
on law-enforcement cooperation is potentially much wider in scope and lays out a number 
of other mechanisms to facilitate international cooperation. Law-enforcement cooperation 
is qualified as police-to-police cooperation and does not ‘exemplify rule of law, but rather 
rule with law’.169 According to Bowling and Sheptycki, legal engineers use legal tools in 
order to attain specific ends, which preserve the existing global system not merely through 
‘black letter law’ but also law in practice.170 Jonathan Winer, a former US Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement argued that the legal 
standards set forth in the UNTOC were designed ‘to meet the new demands of cross-
border enforcement activities, with minimal interference by domestic political 
constraints’,171 which enables TOC to be more effectively combatted. The provisions laid 
out in article 27 may be viewed as a highly flexible framework, which provides 
recommendations on how to engage in law enforcement cooperation, whilst being subject 
to the respective domestic legal and administrative systems. 
 
  Paragraph 1(a) urges state parties to strengthen the channels of communication 
among their respective law enforcement authorities and underlines the need for security in 
exchange of information. After all, ‘the leakage of information may not only prejudice the 
outcome of a particular case but also destroy trust between agencies so essential to 
effective cooperation’.172 Specific forms of cooperation concerning information about 
persons, the movements of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are outlined in 
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paragraph 1(b). However, as the said information is to be used without any immediate 
intention of using it in evidence or of implementing confiscation proceedings, this 
demonstrates the limits of this form of cooperation. The exchange of personnel, including 
the posting of liaison officers, is promoted in paragraph 1(d). One must note that the 
‘drafting is careful to avoid any suggestion that the posting of liaison officers need be on a 
reciprocal basis; such reciprocity is not found in practice, liaison officers being posted to 
meet operational needs and not on some diplomatic analogy’.173 Finally, paragraph 1(f) 
stresses cooperation for purposes of facilitating early identification of offences, whilst 
emphasising administrative measures as opposed to other activities. This is so the sub-
paragraph may be widely applied, since various jurisdictions distinguish between the 
executive, as well as prosecutorial, judicial and other authorities. Finally, the importance of 
international law-enforcement cooperation is highlighted in paragraph 2, whereas 
paragraph 3 emphasis the need to respond to TOC executed through the use of modern 
technology such as cybercrime.   
 
 The UNTOC recognises the importance of law-enforcement cooperation and 
promotes the effective exchange of information and close cooperation between agencies in 
order to avert and tackle all forms of transnational organised crime.  
 
5.1.3.4. Identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of assets and confiscation of proceeds of 
crime (Articles 12, 13 and 14) 
 
 The criminalisation of conduct from which illicit profits are generated does not 
sufficiently punish or deter organised criminal groups, given that these means are used for 
continued activities of said groups. One way of preventing the use of funds and property 
acquired illicitly is to make provisions for the identification, freezing, seizure and 
confiscation thereof. In order for a more global regime to be established, the UNTOC 
devotes three articles to the issue, which describe the basic procedures to be adhered by on 
a domestic and international level. 
 
 Article 12 requires state parties to adopt ‘to the greatest extent possible’ the 
confiscation of the proceeds and property of crime, ‘whether the proceeds were still in the 
hands of the offender or had been passed on to another natural or judicial person’.174 
Moreover, paragraph 1(a) refers to two different techniques employed by state parties: (i) 
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proceeds of crime and (ii) substitution of assets or value-confiscation.  This enables states 
to choose either one or both of these techniques, allowing a wider application. Regarding 
the term ‘instrumentalities’ used in paragraph 1(b) no definition is provided, however the 
1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
Proceeds defines the term as ‘any property used or intended to be used, in any manner, 
wholly or in part, to commit a criminal offence or criminal offences’.175 Accordingly, ‘a 
car used to transport prohibited drugs will fall within this provision, but a car which 
provides the setting for an indecent assault may not’.176 According to paragraph 4, assets 
may still be susceptible to confiscation even if they form part of an aggregate, which was 
subsequently acquired by legitimate sources. Consequently,  third party rights may well be 
affected. With regards to bank secrecy, paragraph 6 demonstrates the importance of 
combating TOC through the discovery of proceeds of crime, given that it provides an 
exception to the most rigorous bank secrecy laws. Article 12, paragraph 7 recommends that 
state parties consider shifting the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the defendant by 
requiring that an offender demonstrate the lawful origin of proceeds to crime. However, a 
limited safeguard is built ‘to prevent abuse of the rights of innocent third parties in (what 
they think is) lawful possession of such property’.177 Paragraph 8 then goes on to state that 
the provisions of the article ‘shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of bona fide third 
parties’.178 This is a problem given that state parties are left to decide how to interpret this 
text.  
 
 Article 13 of the UNTOC mandates procedures for international cooperation in 
confiscation matters, attending to the situation in which property discussed in Article 12 
paragraph 1 is located in another state party from that in which the primary proceedings are 
or will be executed. This article does not aim to harmonise domestic procedures, merely to 
simplify cooperation and to facilitate the recovery of the proceeds of crime, rather than 
assisting in the search for such proceeds as part of the evidence of crime. Article 13 also 
details the way in which such requests are to be drafted, submitted and executed, 
examining these issue with regard to article 18.  
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 Article 14 is the third and last article associated with the identification, tracing, 
freezing or seizure of assets and confiscation of proceeds of crime, attending to the last 
stage of the confiscation process: the disposal of confiscated proceeds of crime. ‘In 
accordance with the well-established principle of international law that issues relating 
property are determined by the lex situs, this paragraph [paragraph 1] applies to 
confiscated property the law of the state in which it is seized’,179 with state parties being 
asked in paragraph 2 ‘to give priority to requests from other states parties for the return of 
such assets for use as compensation to crime victims or restoration to legitimate owner’.180 
Given that the costs associated with mutual assistance are of particular concern to states, 
paragraph 3 recommends that proceeds be forwarded to the United Nations, 
intergovernmental organisations specialising in TOC or be shared with other state parties 
that have facilitated their confiscation. 
 
 Whereas the UNTOC only outlines the measures to be taken for the identification, 
tracing, freezing or seizure of assets and confiscation of proceeds of crime, the UNCAC 
outlines detailed regulations. Therefore, state parties ought to consider ratifying the 
UNCAC so as to more effectively tackle transnational organised crime through the 
disruption of sources of funding.   
 
5.1.4. The United Nations’ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children 
 
 The UNTOC’s trafficking protocol ‘represents a ‘symbolic’ achievement for the 
United Nations’ bodies involved in its drafting, and an advance in reconceptualising 
trafficking as a human rights concern, as well as a crime and migration control issue’.181 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that trafficking is considered, in this context, to be a 
criminal activity and not a human rights issue. There are other international instruments 
that address human trafficking, such as those prohibiting slavery, as well as other human 
rights and humanitarian law instruments. However, previous instruments had two major 
deficiencies: (i) They did not provide a basic notion of what human trafficking entailed and 
what its underlying causes were and (ii) The definitions placed too much emphasis on the 
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transportation and too little on the selling and buying of people.182 As Ilias Chatzis said: 
‘Human trafficking is complicated to investigate, prove or get a solid case to court’,183 a 
factor, which is amplified because the definition of the crime itself is complex. Indeed, 
various scholars argue that the protocol’s definition cannot appropriately be encompassed 
into domestic legislation because ‘it has too many elements that would have to be proven 
by prosecutors, thus making prosecutions more difficult. Also some of the language is 
ambiguous, which could also lead [to] legal challenges’.184 The UNTOC’s protocol has 
introduced preventative and protective measures, which address all aspects of the crime 
and balances criminal justice concerns without weakening states’ responsibilities. Also, 
state parties have mandatory obligations to address root problems, which ‘override the less 
onerous due diligence obligations imposed under human rights law by virtue of the lex 
specialis maxim’.185 Nevertheless, it has failed to thoroughly identify, prevent and respond 
to trafficking for labour exploitation, child trafficking and trafficking in organs, as well as 
address victim support in more detail. Further, state parties should be provided with the 
necessary expertise to adequately handle cases emanating from transnational organised 
crime, as well mechanisms required for the harmonisation of certain provisions.186  
 
 Articles 1 and 2 put into perspective the protocol’s relation with the UNTOC, with 
the latter providing a statement of purpose, underscoring that the protocol is primarily 
concerned with cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking in persons. 
Article 3 provides the applicable definition of ‘trafficking in persons’, subject to fervent 
discussion during the negotiation process. Paragraph (a) introduces the acts involved, the 
means used, and the purpose of the actor. Although some combinations of act and means 
are improbable, such an exhaustive list assures that all scenarios are covered. Paragraph (b) 
is the outcome of discussion regarding the issues of consent, arguing that ‘the ‘means’ in 
paragraph (a) are an essential element in the definition of ‘trafficking’, so the effect of 
paragraph (b) is that the consent of the victim is always irrelevant’.187 The protocol takes a 
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novel approach to the ‘consent’ of victim, acknowledging the role of misrepresentations 
and half-truths.188 
 
Articles 6-8 focus on the protection of victims of trafficking in persons, albeit the 
protocol’s emphasis being law enforcement rather than human rights, the first article in this 
chapter (article 6) addresses assistance to and protection of victims of trafficking. 
Paragraph 1 obliges state parties to ‘protect the privacy and identity of victims of 
trafficking in persons’, not limiting its scope to legal proceedings. However, in certain 
jurisdictions ‘there may be even greater legal obstacles to the prohibition of any reference 
to the name of a trafficked person’.189 In many jurisdictions the suppression of names is 
regarded an exceptional step since the court presumes that it is in the public’s interest to 
make the names available.  Paragraph 3 goes further than the provisions of Article 25(1) of 
the convention in that it encourages state parties ‘to provide for the physical, psychological 
and social recovery of victims’. Nevertheless, victim participation in proceedings, housing, 
and counselling of victims, as well as victim safety and compensation are only addressed 
in a limited fashion. Moreover, ‘the protocol neither obliges parties to grant victims 
immunity from criminal liability nor identifies in detail who is a victim, a pre-condition for 
their protection’.190 The status of victims of trafficking in persons in receiving states is 
discussed in Article 7. Nonetheless, given the strained relationship between trafficking and 
general immigrant law, state parties did not consent to the insertion of a right to remain in 
the destination country. Finally, article 8 creates obligations for states with regard to the 
repatriation of victims of trafficking in persons. Paragraph 2 requires that state party 
returning the victim must have ‘due regard for the safety of that person and for the status of 
any legal proceedings’. Moreover, paragraph 2 encourages voluntary return, yet ‘does not 
prohibit compulsory repatriation against the known wishes of the victims’.191 Paragraphs 3 
and 4 discuss cooperation procedures for the return of victims, including, inter alia, the 
verification of the victim’s nationality or right of permanent residence and the issuance of 
documents.  
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The final chapter of the protocol revolves around prevention, cooperation and other 
measures. Article 9 strives to guide state parties’ efforts to prevent trafficking in persons, 
encouraging states to establish policies, programmes, and other measures to prevent and 
combat human trafficking as well as protect its victims. Article 10 stresses the need to 
exchange information and training in order to more effectively identify offenders and 
victims, as well as the means and methods used for trafficking in persons, including 
recruitment, transportation and routes. Paragraph 2 encourages state parties to provide 
training programs to those confronted with human trafficking in order to ensure that 
victims of trafficking are identified and to prevent investigations from being compromised. 
Article 11 goes on to touch upon a matter closely associated with state sovereignty, namely 
border control. Paragraph 1 obliges state parties to reinforce their border controls as to 
prevent and detect trafficking in persons without impairing the free movement of people. 
‘However, a possible negative side effect of strengthened border controls is the 
displacement of traffickers’ routes as traffickers change their methods’.192 Moreover, under 
paragraphs 2 and 3, states must impose requirements on commercial carriers to check 
whether or not passengers are in possession of the required travel or identity documents, 
without unduly restricting the discretion of state parties not to hold carriers liable for 
transporting undocumented individuals. Finally, articles 12 and 13 address the security and 
control of documents, as well as their legitimacy and validity setting minimum standards.  
 
The UNTOC’s protocol extends the scope of trafficking by recognising its various 
forms, whilst nevertheless perpetuating a gendered perception of the phenomenon given its 
objective of protecting women and children. Further, trafficking in persons has been 
relocated into the realm of international criminal law, thus ‘a continued perception of 
trafficking as a threat to the nation-state and the control of territorial borders such that 
immigration control and criminal justice measures are prioritised’.193 Whilst a majority of 
criminal justice provisions are mandatory, measures relating to the assistance for trafficked 
persons are superficial and largely not compulsory.194 As a result, the protocol establishes 
minimum standards for victim support and protection, which state parties are encouraged 
to strengthen through their own domestic law and policy.195 Finally, the protocol suffers 
from a lack of enforcement given the lack of consensus as to whether trafficked people 
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moved across international borders are considered refugees and are entitled to the 
international protections that come with this status.  
 
5.1.5. The United Nations’ Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air 
	
 As flows of illicit migrants began to steadily increase, states called for the 
development of an instrument directed toward coordinating efforts to suppress those who 
facilitate the flow. As a result, the United Nations’ Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air became the primary legal instrumented targeting the 
suppression of migrant smuggling, whilst fostering cooperation to target smugglers and 
protect those they smuggle. Nevertheless, with reference to the smuggling by air, 
additional prevention and suppression measures should be introduced, as there ‘does not 
seem to be a clear articulation of the measures states parties should adopt’.196 Further, state 
parties obligations under international law, including international human rights law and 
international refugees’ law ought to be stressed, as well as practical methods to assist state 
parties who lack the necessary capacity and expertise to address smuggling.  
 
 Article 3 of the protocol defines smuggling of migrants as ‘the procurement, in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal 
entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent 
resident’. The protocol emphasises the intention to include the activities of organised 
criminal groups acting for profit, whilst excluding ‘the activities of those who provided 
support to migrants for humanitarian reasons or on the basis of close family ties’.197 Yet, 
by excluding those individuals, the element of benefit may be misused in order to bypass 
criminal responsibility. Criminal liability of migrants is discussed in article 5, which 
argues that smuggled migrants do not have immunity from prosecution, but having been 
the object of smuggling will not be the subject of criminal charges. Article 6 requires state 
parties to criminalise three forms of conduct: First, ‘the procurement…of the illegal entry 
of a person into a state party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident’. 
However, the term procurement remains undefined and it is unclear whether it also 
includes acts of facilitation. Paragraph 1(b) requires the criminalisation of producing, 
procuring, providing, or possessing fraudulent travel or identity documents, but excludes 
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those who possess such a document so as to enable their own smuggling. Paragraph 1(c) 
‘is aimed at suppressing the actions of those individuals who facilitate migrants remaining 
in the host country clandestinely or otherwise illegally’,198 such as, for example, employers 
who recruit illegal migrants. 
 
The smuggling of migrants by sea is discussed in articles 7 to 9, with article 7 
providing that state parties cooperate ‘to prevent and supress the smuggling of migrants by 
sea, in accordance with the international law of the sea’. Hence, the measures set forth 
‘cannot be taken in the territorial sea of another state except with the permission or 
authorisation of the coastal state concerned’.199 Article 8 provides that a state party may 
cooperate with other state parties with regards to its own flagged vessels, vessels flying the 
flag of other states parties, vessels without nationality or a vessel assimilated to a vessel 
without nationality. Under paragraph 7, a ‘state party that has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea and is without 
nationality or may be assimilated to a vessel without nationality may board and search the 
vessel’ without seeking prior authorisation. Should such cooperation occur, article 9 sets 
forth the safeguards to be taken by state parties, such as ensuring ‘the safety and humane 
treatment of the persons on board’. 
 
Articles 10-18 address prevention, cooperation and other measures. Article 10 
concerns itself with information exchange, however, as it does not specify how the process 
ought to be conducted states may encounter difficulties in its implementation. Border 
measures addressed in article 11 reflect the text as it appears in the migrants’ protocol and 
were ‘adopted on the understanding that it would not be applied in such a way as to induce 
commercial carriers to impede unduly the movement of legitimate passengers’.200 Articles 
12 and 13 reflect the same content as the trafficking in persons protocol concerning the 
security and control of documents, as well as their legitimacy and validity and the setting 
of minimum standards. Article 14 elaborates the nature of training and technical 
cooperation to be provided regarding migrant smuggling.  Paragraph 1 requires state 
parties to provide or strengthen training on smuggling prevention and in ‘the humane 
treatment of migrants who have been the object of such conduct’, whilst paragraph 2 
emphasises ‘cooperation between state parties and with other bodies including NGOs [non-
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governmental organisations]’.201 Paragraph 3 encourages state parties to ‘consider 
providing technical assistance to other States that are frequently countries of origin or 
transit for persons who have been object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this protocol’. 
According to McClean, this is in the interest of all state parties if the goals of the protocol 
are to be realised.202 Other prevention measures such as public awareness campaigns and 
addressing root causes are discussed in article 15. Although paragraph 3 addresses 
economic migration, it does not instruct state parties to adopt any specific policy in its 
immigration laws. Article 16 suggests protection and assistance measures, with paragraph 
1 aiming at guaranteeing victims their fundamental human rights, right to life and not be 
subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Nevertheless, this non-exhaustive list should not be understood to exclude or derogate 
from any other rights. Paragraph 2 obliges state parties to ‘take appropriate measures to 
afford migrants appropriate protection against violence’, but does not expand on what is 
meant by ‘appropriate measures’. Article 18 requires state parties to contemplate the return 
of smuggled migrants to their countries of origin. State parties must ensure that all 
processes or procedures with regard to return of smuggled migrants comply with 
international law, in particular human rights, refugee and humanitarian law. Overall, the 
provisions are comparable with those of article 8 of the trafficking protocol. Finally, article 
19 ‘provides that the protocol leaves unaltered the obligations of states and the rights of 
individuals under the Refugees Convention’.203 
 
The UNTOC’s protocol on migrant smuggling aims to strengthen ‘underdeveloped 
legal frameworks, weak law enforcement, and poor prosecutorial and judicial practices’204 
which have allowed smugglers to operate without being punished. Further, suppression 
focuses on the supply rather than the demand side.  
 
5.1.6. The United Nations’ Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in 
Firearms, their Parts and Components, and Ammunition 
 
 The firearms protocol comprises a framework for state parties to prevent the illicit 
manufacturing and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition. 
The protocol includes provisions on the illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms as 
national criminal offences, the criminalisation of illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in 
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firearms, adequate security measures over stored firearms, and establishes a system of 
authorisation or licensing regarding legitimate manufacturing and commerce, marking, 
recording and tracing of firearms, and international cooperation. Moreover, ‘under 
international human rights law, states are required to exercise due diligence to protect 
people within their territory from abuses, even when they are committed by private 
persons’205 and are, in addition, obligated to regulate firearms to protect their citizenry. It is 
largely based on the 1997 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other related materials.206 However, 
the protocol’s scope is more restricted since it does not incorporate explosives, such as 
grenades, and other related materials. The protocol aims to differentiate between licit trade 
and illicit traffic, suppressing the latter and excluding state-to-state transactions. Scholars 
like Salton argue that the firearms protocol ‘essentially undercuts its own rigor by ignoring 
one of the most prevalent forms of SALW [small arms and light weapons] transactions’207: 
state-to-state transactions. Furthermore, one may contend that the protocol is not specific 
enough in its provisions, lacks mandatory articles, an effective enforcement mechanism 
and fails to provide a methodology for information exchange and customs enforcement.208  
 
 The firearms protocol is divided into three chapters, the first chapter containing 
general provisions, the second discussing prevention and the final chapter is composed of 
final provisions. The scope of application (article 4) sets forth that the protocol does not 
apply to state-to-state transactions given that including said transfers may broaden the 
scope too far and risk entering the security realm. State to non-state actor transactions are 
not directly addressed, leaving it to state parties to decide whether the aforementioned 
ought to be included or not. Article 5, paragraph 1 requires state parties to criminalise the 
following: illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking and falsifying or illicitly obliterating, 
removing or altering firearms markings. As well as the aforementioned, paragraph 2 
criminalises accomplice liability and organising, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating, or 
counselling offences. It is important to note that illicit manufacturing comprises, according 
to article 3(d): ‘(i) manufacturing from illicitly trafficked parts; (ii) manufacturing without 
a licence or authorisation; and (iii) manufacturing without marking’.209 Article 6 requires 
state parties to adopt measures that allow them to confiscate, seize and dispose of illicitly 
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manufactured or trafficked firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition. 
Disposal does not infer their destruction if other means of disposal are authorised and the 
firearms are marked and their disposal recorded. Articles 7 through 15 address the 
preventative measures, such as record keeping (article 7). Article 7 obliges states to 
maintain records of information relating to firearms, leaving it to the state party to decide 
by whom said records are to be kept and by which method. In today’s globalised society, a 
computerised system is preferable given its easy access and efficiency in tracing firearms. 
Article 8 concerns itself with the marking of firearms, there being no obvious requirement 
to have a system of marking parts and ammunition, but states are nevertheless obliged ‘to 
keep records relating to parts and ammunition to enable illicit trafficking to be detected’.210 
Paragraph 1(a) stipulates that unique markings must be applied at the time of manufacture, 
with state parties being able to choose from two different systems: (i) geometric and (ii) 
alphanumeric markings. However, exclusively applying alphanumeric markings would 
have guaranteed a high degree of transparency, enabling governments to trace weapons 
back to the manufacturer without the assistance of the original exporting government. 
Imported firearms must be marked so as to permit identification of the country and year of 
import, unless a unique identifier has already been used. Interestingly, as firearms for 
temporary importation do not require markings to be applied, they cannot easily be 
identified. Finally, paragraph 1(c) requires firearms to be marked at the time of transfer 
from government stockpiles. Yet, the marking of firearms produced for government use 
has not been addressed by the protocol, although one may assume that the requirements are 
applicable to all firearms, regardless of their intended use. Article 9 is intended for state 
parties that do not recognise deactivated firearms as a ‘firearms’ under their domestic law. 
These States are required to take measures to prevent the illicit reactivation of firearms, to 
avoid them being altered so as to, for example, expel a projectile. General requirements for 
export, import and transit licensing or authorisation systems are set forth in article 10. 
Although paragraph 1 permits states to devise and maintain their own system, the 
remaining article sets ‘parameters in terms of the content of documents and the procedures 
to be followed’211 so as to achieve a certain standardisation. Moreover, paragraph 2 
provides a vague notion of authorisation, as there are no requirements as to what such 
authorisation includes.212 The information to be contained in export and import licences or 
authorisation and accompanying documentation is set out in paragraph 3. A weakness to be 
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noted is that the information must not be contained in any single document and only the 
essential information is to be included in one document with others simply alluding to said 
document. Information exchange is discussed in article 12, compelling states to exchange 
‘case-specific’ information, as well as general intelligence and scientific information. It is 
noteworthy that cooperation in tracing is ‘only’ discussed in paragraph 4 and is not subject 
of a separate article given its importance in criminal investigations and for record keeping.  
Finally, article 10 paragraph 1 urges state parties to regulate brokers and brokering by 
establishing a system that includes one or more measures such as: ‘(a) requiring 
registration of brokers operating within their territory; (b) requiring licensing or 
authorisation of brokering; or (c) requiring disclosure on import and export licences, 
authorisations, or accompanying documents, of the names and locations of brokers 
involved in the transaction’. Should a state party decide to introduce a registration system, 
it is free to select its design. Further, unanswered questions, as stipulated by McClean 
remain: ‘When does a broker ‘operate’ within the territory of a state? Does this mean that 
he is based there, or has a working base there; or is meeting to negotiate a transaction 
sufficient to amount to ‘operating’? Does ‘the licensing or authorisation of brokering’ refer 
to engaging in the activity or to each and every transaction?’.213  
 
 The firearms protocol focuses on a crime and law-enforcement approach, which 
limits its scope and content. In order to address the harmful effects of illicit manufacture 
and trafficking in firearms, the protocol establishes a system of government authorisation 
and a system of marking and tracing to fulfil its aims. Given the protocol’s weaknesses, the 
landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), regulating the international trade in conventional 
arms, entered into force in December 2014. Compared to the firearms protocol, the ATT 
details when and how to regulate export controls and coordinate state action and obliges 
states to participate in a reporting and public information system. And ‘while the ATT does 
not prohibit the transfer of weapons to non-state groups, it provides some language to 
further regulate their sale’.214 
 
5.1.7. Conclusion 
 
 The United Nations’ Convention against Transnational Organised Crime definition 
of organised crime incorporates a range of different crimes and as such can function as 
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basis for international criminal cooperation in regards to a wide range of serious crimes 
when these are transnational in nature. State parties may, nevertheless, be reluctant to use 
the UNTOC as a framework for cooperation given that it is ‘probably more than most can 
either legally engage in or politically stomach’.215 One must bear in mind that the UNTOC 
serves as a framework to improve international legislation and enable cooperation between 
state parties. It does not constitute an operational treaty, which oversees specific crime-
fighting activities.216 Despite its weaknesses, the UNTOC may be viewed as a major 
breakthrough in the development of international criminal law, as it brought about 
unprecedented opportunities for transnational cooperation in criminal justice. Yet, it would 
constitute a more effective framework had it included further mandatory obligations for 
state parties rather than function ‘as just another case of soft law codifying international 
best practices in criminal justice’.217 
 
 With regards to the UNTOC’s three protocols, they each address complex 
phenomenon associated with TOC and represent symbolic achievements for the United 
Nations. Nevertheless, the UNTOC’s protocols have been criticised as, in the words of 
Antonio Maria Costa: 
 
Two out of three of the UNTOC protocols are inactive. The Firearms 
Protocol has few state parties, none among the major arms producers: a hand-
gun is cheaper than a cellular phone. The Smuggling of Migrants Protocol is 
also neglected, despite the daily tragedy of tens of thousands of desperate 
people who pay a small fortune to cross perilous seas, deserts and mountains 
– and very often end up paying with their lives.218 
 
Moreover, with regards to the trafficking and the migrant smuggling protocol, similarities 
have been identified, yet on an international level little discussion has taken place on their 
distinctions and whether there is potential for conflict. Further, the Inter-Agency Group has 
expressed concern about the possible consequences of a state acceding to one but not both 
protocols.219 Trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling are multidimensional issues, 
which cannot merely be viewed from a criminal law perspective, and consequently legal 
instruments must also embrace protective and human rights considerations. The firearms 
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protocol may be limited in scope, but it nevertheless sets forth a control measures and 
normative provisions embracing various aspects of the illicit manufacture and trafficking 
in firearms.  
 
5.2. Key challenges facing implementation 
 
  In 2010, the United Nations reported that, to its knowledge, only 19 of 157 state 
parties to the United Nations’ Convention against Transnational Organised Crime had 
utilised it as an instrument ‘to facilitate international cooperation, including extradition, to 
fight organised crime groups’.220 Therefore, UNTOC is used insufficiently as the basis for 
international cooperation and legal assistance. What challenges do state parties face when 
implementing such an instrument? 
 
In order for numerous state parties to ratify any multilateral treaty, given their 
disparate views and objectives, imaginative and subtle drafting is required, which 
necessarily produces unclear or ambiguous wording.221 However, such wording is not 
merely used in order to incorporate competing states interests and legal systems, but also 
so as to allow for changes in society. Hence, too narrow provisions may exclude 
unforeseeable events, restricting the convention’s scope and creating eventual loopholes. 
That being said, although the UNTOC appears sufficiently broad, it lacks the framework 
enabling state parties effectively tackle, inter alia, the realities of cybercrime, anonymity 
or the challenges of international cooperation. Moreover, given the UNTOC’s focus on 
criminal justice provisions, state parties may deem the framework too restricted to include 
innovative approaches or even to draw conclusions from lessons learned. Finally, the 
UNTOC’s extensive prevention chapter ‘contains so many measures, policies and practices 
that the full and effective implementation […] is a long-term project’.222 
 
Another problem is reflected by the reservations state parties include when 
ratifying the convention, resulting in implementation remaining discretional and difficult to 
measure. The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties enables states ‘to enter RUDs 
[reservations, understandings, or declarations] at the time of ratification so long as the text 
of the treaty in question does not expressly prohibit RUDs and the RUD itself is not 
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incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty’.223 However, states may potentially 
bargain around the object and purpose test, effectively weakening or even repealing the 
legal obligations that the states accepted upon ratification. Commonly, states enter RUDs 
for their current conduct to be classified as compliance, so as to avoid ‘openly violating 
international law where such behaviour would impose domestic political costs’224 or to 
reduce unintended domestic effects. Furthermore, treaty obligations may also be more 
stringent than the domestic legal status quo ante. Despite that, RUDs can reinforce treaty 
breadth and depth or introduce flexibility devices that can promote treaty commitments.225 
‘Some scholars have [even] suggested that RUDs may lead to more honest reflections of 
the positions of reserving states and can provide a starting point for engaging with and 
eventually internalising particular norms’.226 Generally speaking, early ratifying states 
express their will to cooperate on their own terms, whilst late ratifying states tend to be in a 
more desirable position relative to non-reserving state due to the ‘wealth of information 
about the reactions of existing treaty members to previous reservations’227 at their disposal. 
With regards as the UNTOC, a multitude of states, including Bahrain, Lithuania and 
Vanezuela, have expressed their reservation with regards to article 35 paragraph 2 as they 
do not recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.228 
Moreover, reservations may become obsolete with time. For instance, the reservation 
expressed by Ecuador in conjunction with article 10 UNTOC regarding the criminal 
liability of legal persons. At the time of ratification, since this element was not embodied 
in Ecuadorian law, Ecuador would have been non compliant with article 10 had it not 
expressed this reservation. However, in 2014, Ecuador introduced the Codigo Organico 
Integral Penal del Ecuador, also known as the Organic Integral Criminal Code, (COIP), 
whose articles 49 and 50 concern themselves with corporate liability.229 It is important that 
‘declarations and reservations require regular ‘maintenance’ in order to keep the other 
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parties properly informed about the (im)possibilities of cooperation’.230 Conclusively, 
RUDs may be seen as a ‘tradeoff between protecting the rights and consent of non-
reserving states that anticipate compliance with treaties in their entirety and the rights and 
consent of reserving states that expect to have their RUDs honoured’.231 The international 
community ought to take the legal effects of RUDs seriously, as at the very least they can 
influence perception and at worst mitigate genuine and full treaty participation.  
 
States must commit to investing in the convention, by establishing implementation 
review mechanisms since the UNTOC was not designed with any kind of review 
mechanism. States must translate the provisions expressed in the convention into domestic 
legislation and their law enforcement agencies must implement them. Such a mechanism is 
of importance given that states ought to provide information on the UNTOC’s impact, 
whether it remains fit for purpose, etc… A more dynamic governing body is emanating 
through the Conference of Parties (COP), introducing a more structured and 
comprehensive ‘review mechanism’, which aims not only to review but also to promote 
the implementation of this Convention (see section 5.3. for further information).  The COP 
requires state parties to complete questionnaires, unsuitable for addressing complex issues 
and problems, and to prepare country-reports that remain time-consuming and difficult to 
analyse due to a lack of good guidelines. Furthermore, these reporting mechanisms have 
stalled since 2008 due to a lack of consensus and the inability to create a user friendly 
information gathering software.232 State parties still remain averse to providing information 
on their performance, especially when this may bring about criticism.233 It may well be that 
state parties would be more inclined to cooperate if they were provided with further 
legislative and reform assistance, involving expert analysis, review of legislation and 
compliance with international standards.234 An example of a more comprehensive review 
mechanism is the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), an independent and 
quasi-judicial monitoring body, established for the implementation of the United Nations’ 
drug control conventions, may serve as a model of for implementation review mechanisms. 
The INCB includes multiple features such as self-assessment, review, dialogue, country 
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visits, bench-marking and technical assistance.235 Furthermore, it draws information and 
expertise from international governmental organisations and non-governmental 
organisations.236 
 
Further key challenges are symbolic compliance by states that accede so as to gain 
access to continued development assistance or technical support, as well the asymmetry of 
means and capacity among state parties. Such continued assistance is sought as some states 
view ratification as a ‘final destination’ rather than a ‘starting point’. Moreover, powerful 
states may exert pressure upon states, which rely on the former’s assistance in order to 
‘persuade’ the latter to ratify a convention. An example, albeit regional, is the Trafficking 
in Persons (TIP) Report, which the US State Department is required, by law, to issue to the 
US Congress on a yearly basis. Should states fail to meet the minimum requirements, they 
can be placed on a watch-list or denied non-trade related assistance.237 States may also face 
problems associated with the development of their domestic legal system, which may 
result in non-compliance. This non-compliance does ‘not reflect a deliberate decision to 
violate an international undertaking on the basis of a calculation of interests’,238 but 
correlates with a state’s bureaucratic, infrastructural and coercive capacities. Changing 
social or economic conditions may weaken the state, rendering it incapable of abiding by 
their original commitments. As such, treaty terms may have to be renegotiated or adapted 
to changed circumstances. Since the implementation of a treaty may be costly, time-
consuming and require an extensive review and/or revision of legislation, states may be 
unwilling or unable to allocate the resources and expertise required, necessitating that 
treaty implementation occur gradually. Moreover, the convention presupposes that ‘the 
state parties involved already have a somewhat efficient or even functional criminal justice 
system’,239 which is often not the case in developing countries where organised crime 
poses a considerable threat to development and security. Amongst other things, these states 
lack harmonisation and cooperation, whilst also facing problems in the prosecution and 
convictions of offenders. 240 The legal avenues through which to pursue claims and the 
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expertise to prepare and take timely action are often absent.241 Moreover, courts may be 
incapable of interpreting, let alone applying the norms incorporated from a treaty. 
Domestic legislation will continue to prevail since it cannot be reunited with international 
law. 242 Even if legislative approval is present and the norms can be interpreted, ‘the 
implementing law requires further action through regulations or more detailed legislation 
before the provisions can be judicially enforced’, 243 introducing further obstacles. This is 
so as treaties are often ‘not considered self-executing and thus binding as such in the 
domestic legal order’.244 Despite that, states with insufficient domestic legal orders have 
turned toward the so-called international ‘safety net’,245 often demonstrating respect for 
international law and giving it greater importance on the domestic level. 246 These states 
may require external aid, such as the provision of technical assistance and the setting of 
benchmarks and standards,247 or have to be ‘invested with the indigenous capacity to 
comply’248 so as to enhance their own capability. For example, the development of 
straightforward, simple and common goals for the rule of law may strengthen national 
capacities.249 Conclusively, one may argue that ‘failures to comply are not due to the depth 
and severity of the demands imposed and the resulting domestic opposition, but rather to 
the capacity to comply and different understandings of what compliance requires’.250 
Moreover, the UNTOC’s success relies on attitude changes and ‘whether the convention’s 
substantive principles and messages are well known to all and converted into a way of 
life’.251  
 
 Key challenges facing implementation, include, but are not limited to, ‘state 
capacity, national concern, institutional constraints on a domestic level and the availability 
of monitoring mechanism’252 as well as external and internal factors.   
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5.3. Monitoring implementation of the UNTOC and its protocols 
 
 The basic principle of international law, pacta sunt servanda, requires state parties 
to a suppression convention to act in good faith and enforce the provisions of the treaty, as 
well as satisfy the further obligations. The United Nations’ have, in order to monitor the 
implementation of its conventions, established more structured and comprehensive review 
mechanisms. 
 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has devised a ‘software tool that 
allows individual signatories of UNTOC to upload key information on compliance and 
implementation of UNTOC’.253 Furthermore, the Conference of Parties (COP) 
requisitioned an online directory, a network of central authorities, as well as an index of 
exemplar cases on international criminal cooperation.254 Despite these apparent 
improvements in advancing a system of monitoring, the information provided by state 
parties remains superficial and incomplete. Further, state parties should provide the COP 
with detailed reports including data on the impact of implementation.255 Given the 
UNTOC’s inadequate implementation review mechanisms, the convention’s objectives 
may be jeopardised, as state parties are unable to achieve the affirmed purposes. To 
effectively combat transnational organised crime, it is essential that the provisions be 
enforced in a consistent, transparent and accountable manner. Furthermore, as the number 
of state parties participating in a convention increases, monitoring and finding consensus 
becomes increasingly more difficult. That being said, review mechanisms aim to promote 
suppression conventions and encourage state parties to put the former into effect. With 
increasing ratification of the UNTOC by state parties, the pressure on non-member states 
to become a member increases. Nevertheless, the former only occurs if the monitoring 
system is viewed as not infringing upon a state’s sovereignty. With regards to the UNTOC, 
‘other proposals suggesting a subsidiary monitoring body, a regional evaluation process, 
and a peer review system including sanctions for non-compliance’256 were dismissed as 
member states viewed such a system as a loss of sovereignty. Moreover, such stringent 
monitoring systems would not only expose non-compliance, but also weaknesses in a 
state’s judiciary, executive, legislative branches. According to Bilder, emphasising 
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‘compliance may point towards a backwards- looking and essentially legalistic approach 
focusing on state ‘misbehaviour,’ rather than towards a productive enquiry into devising 
and deploying better normative techniques and arrangements that facilitate more effective 
international dealings and cooperation’.257 Focusing on such ‘misbehaviour’ has not 
proven effective, as no sanctions have been imposed on non-complying members.  In the 
opinion of Krisch ‘the role of treaties as ‘transmission belts’, ensuring accountability to 
states and through the ratification process also to the public within states, has become 
weaker and weaker, just as demands for stronger accountability have risen in the face of 
ever more intrusive global regulation of formerly domestic affairs’.258 It is becoming ever 
more important that civil society, government agencies and further stakeholders are 
included in the monitoring process in order to increase accountability and to promote 
comprehensive and transparent reporting. A system of peer review would present an 
alternative, as it fosters a space for mutual learning. An example of such a monitoring 
system is the Financial Action Task Force’s ‘peer-review-style ‘mutual evaluations’, in 
which one country’s experts work with the mechanisms backed up by hefty sticks such as 
denial of access to international financial flows, which have combined international 
legitimacy with effective sanctions mechanisms’.259  
 
 In order to improve the UNTOC and its implementation, states ought to support the 
implementation of a monitoring mechanism so as to effectively tackle transnational 
organised crime. Rather than establishing a new mechanism, existing instruments should 
be strengthened with support of the international community. The strengthened 
mechanisms should not simply replicate the monitoring system of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption, but rather be adapted to the needs of state parties of the 
UNTOC. It is important that all state parties concerned participate in a more dynamic 
monitoring mechanism, intended to cultivate a more constructive dialogue. Gaps and 
priorities toward the implementation of the convention must be identified. That being said, 
the review mechanism must remain efficient and agile. Ideally, a system incorporating 
both expert and peer review ought to be brought in place, which also involves civil society. 
Moreover, a wide range of data sources should be consulted when reviewing state parties’ 
contributions to the UNOCD and the UNTOC and its protocols and recommendations 
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advanced. Finally, it is important that the review mechanism is ‘transparent, efficient, non-
intrusive, inclusive and impartial’.260 
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CHAPTER VI 
REGIONAL VERSUS INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
 
6.1. The European Union’s approach to transnational organised crime 
 
 Since the 1970s and the establishment of the Trevi group,261 organised crime has 
been on the agenda of European states.262 It wasn’t until the 1990s and the growing 
influence of the Mafia and Russian organised crime that the Ad Hoc Group on 
International Organised Crime was established and the European Union ‘started to respond 
and counter the emergence of organised crime as a general security threat in parallel with 
its ‘Single Market’ integration project’.263 The Ad Hoc Group on International Crime dealt 
with serious crime such as drug trafficking, bank robbery and arms trafficking.264 
Moreover, it produced an analysis of organised criminal groups active within the European 
Union and issued recommendations regarding more effective cooperation.265 A new 
dimension was added to the economic concerns following the introduction of the Schengen 
Agreement (1985-1990) and the removal of barriers to illicit trade and other criminal 
activities.266 Member states started to shift their decision-making to a supranational level 
and committed ‘to common ways of working and agreed rules’.267  
 
 The European Union has addressed the threat posed by organised crime in the 
context of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (ASFJ), introduced by the Amsterdam 
Treaty.268 The Treaty of Amsterdam enabled member states to better cooperate in matters 
of visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons. 
The Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU) then established EU competence in approximating criminal 
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law in up to 10 areas of ‘particularly serious crime with cross border dimension (art. 
83(1)(1) TFEU)’269 and allows for the possibility of expanding the scope to crimes not 
explicitly listed in article 83(1)(1).270 Further, with regards to criminal procedure, the 
TFEU enables the adoption of minimum rules regarding, inter alia, mutual admissibility of 
evidence, and facilitates mutual recognition and law enforcement cooperation.271 In 
substantive criminal law, approximation takes place as to the definition of offences and 
sanctions for serious crime with a cross-border dimension. Moreover, article 83(2) of the 
TFEU ‘enables approximation of criminal law if it is ‘essential to ensure the effective 
implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation 
measures’’.272 This approximation is said to support the functioning of judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters as well as the effective functioning of European bodies in the field of 
criminal policy. Nevertheless, as Lord has argued, ‘the Union uses a fragmented 
governance structure to handle security questions’ because ‘EU security might be 
conceptualised as a problem of co-ordination between actors with significant autonomy of 
one another’’.273  
 
6.2. Organised crime legislation in the European Union 
 
 On an international level, various international institutions have sought to address 
the threat posed by transnational organised crime. Inter alia, the United Nations and the 
European Union have introduced measures aimed at harmonising criminal legislation 
dealing with TOC. The first international legal instrument was introduced by the EU in 
1998 with the Joint Action (JA) on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal 
organisation which also provided the first agreed upon definition of organised crime and 
contained criminalisation requirements.274 The UNTOC then followed the JA in 2000, 
introducing a global legal definition of an organised criminal group. In 2008, the European 
Union then introduced the Framework Decision (FD) on the Fight against Organised crime 
																																																						
269 Vincenzo Militello, ‘Transnational Organized Crime and European Union: Aspects and Problems’ in 
Stefano Ruggeri (ed), Human Rights in European Criminal Law (Springer International Publishing 
Switzerland 2015) 203. 
270 ibid. 
271 Valsamis Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2009). 
272 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) art 83 para 2. 
273 Allum and Den Boer (n 43) 2. 
274 Joint Action 98/733/JHA of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union, on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the 
Member States of the European Union [1998] OJ L 351. 
CHAPTER VI 
	
77 
aiming to update and reformat the Joint Action (98/733/JHA) so as to ensure its 
compatibility with the UNTOC.275 
 
 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime definition 
of organised crime echoes the Joint Action’s definition, remaining rather broad. Moreover, 
the UNTOC ‘infers the illicit nature of a group from the commission of “one or more 
serious crimes” or offences established by the Convention, just as provided by the JA’.276 
As in the JA, the UNTOC follows a quantitative selection of the notion of ‘serious crime’, 
which creates a ‘proportionality between criminal acts and respective penalties [which] is 
not an absolute concept but only a relative one measuring the scale of reaction of a 
particular legal order’.277 Contrary to the JA, the UNTOC broadens the scope of the 
provision, as an organised criminal group may exist solely for the commission of a single 
offence, which makes it more difficult to distinguish it from simple participation in a crime 
involving more than two persons.278 With regards to the criminalisation provisions, both 
the UNTOC and the JA adopt a double model offence approach. Interestingly, the civil law 
model offence of the UNTOC criminalises the participation in any criminal act committed 
by the group. Thus, contrary to the JA, which criminalises also the participation in the non-
criminal activities of the group, provided the apparent legal activity is conducive to the 
achievement of the illegal aims of the group. Regarding penalties, the UNTOC requires 
that state parties consider the gravity of the offences and leaves greater autonomy to states 
concerning the penalties for participation in a criminal organisation as does the JA. The 
UNTOC does not follow the approach of the JA to the jurisdiction of criminal organisation 
offences. It imposes a minimum standard (territorial jurisdiction) with some possible 
supplementary norms. To conclude, the UNTOC follows the approach laid out by the JA, 
having made few improvements regarding criticisms made about the latter.    
 
 In 2008, the third international law instrument providing a definition of organised 
crime was introduced by the European Union: The Framework Decision (2008/841/JHA). 
The legislative instrument of framework decision, was adopted by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in order to achieve greater approximation of criminal law in the EU. The 2008 
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framework decision was introduced following the growing convergence between terrorism 
and organised crime brought about by the events of 9/11. Although organised criminal 
activities have been used to fund terror operations, it remains difficult to distinguish these 
phenomena due to a possible overlap in activities, resulting in greater difficulty when 
combating them.279 Finally, following the entry into force of the UNTOC, the JA had to be 
adapted so as to assure the compatibility between the EU’s law and the suppression 
convention.280  
 
 The framework decision introduced a new definition of criminal organisation, 
retaining the term ‘criminal organisation’ developed in the JA, whilst adopting the ultimate 
objectives  (‘to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’) of the 
organised criminal group as laid out by the UNTOC.281 Further, the ‘structured 
association’ is defined, as in the Palermo Convention, in a negative way in order to exclude 
randomly formed groups. Positive elements, which would enable a criminal organisation 
and its modus operandi to be distinguished, remain absent, resulting in a broad definition. 
Moreover, the quantitative threshold of 4 years of maximum deprivation of liberty is 
retained. Hence, criticisms already mentioned in relation to the Joint Action and the 
UNTOC have not been overcome. That being said, providing a list of all recognised crimes 
would prove problematic, as any such list may become obsolete as transnational organised 
crime changes and adapts to external factors. The double model offence approach is 
retained in the framework decision, instead introducing a conspiracy-type paragraph.282 
Therefore, the civil law model differs from the UNTOC, with criminal conduct comprising 
the active taking part in the organisation’s criminal activities and non-criminal conduct, 
such as financing, being set out in a list. Interestingly, the FD introduced the requirement 
of minimum sanctions for the participation in a criminal organisation, sanctioning the 
‘minimum maximum’ technique.283 The introduction of said ‘minimum maximum’ range 
of 2 to 5 years aims to render the FD more flexible and reduce the likelihood of too severe 
penalties.284 Furthermore, for any crime committed within the framework of a criminal 
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organisation, an aggravating circumstance has been inserted. The liability of legal persons 
has been introduced as previously within the JA and the UNTOC. However, contrary to the 
previous instruments, the FD requires that the liability is established (i) ‘legal persons may 
be held liable for any of the offences referred to in Article 2 [if] committed […] [by 
someone holding a] leading position within the legal person’285 and (ii) ‘where the lack of 
supervision or control by a person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the 
commission’. 286 The FD promotes cooperation between member states and helps avoid 
conflicts between the different jurisdictions of European member states, and provides for 
recourse to various European bodies or mechanisms (for example Eurojust).  
 
The framework decision has brought about few improvements compared to 
previous international instruments. The FD has, inter alia, introduced a minimum sanction 
and has rejected the unclear distinction between ‘criminal activities’ and ‘other activities’. 
Nevertheless, the framework decision ends up being at odds with itself, leaving a wide 
margin of discretion to national legislator in the interpretation and implementation of the 
FD’s provisions, which may appear imprecise and misleading to the national legislator. In 
2011, the European Parliament, with the adoption of the Resolution on organised crime in 
the European Union, recognized the  ‘extremely limited impact on the legislative systems 
of the member States of Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on organised crime, which 
has not made any significant improvement to national laws or to operational cooperation to 
counter organised crime’.287 
 
Despite significant improvements over the years, the European Union’s legislative 
instruments have not attained the expected harmonisation. That being said, the European 
Union has taken steps to strengthen its legislation ‘to enhance the effectiveness of EU law 
in the field of organised crime, by justifying the transition from an EU instrument of 
uncertain legal force (a Joint Action) to a clearly legally-binding Framework Decision’.288 
Nevertheless, the EU has the possibility to further strengthen organised crime legislation, 
since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has established a specific legal basis for 
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the harmonisation of criminal provisions relating to transnational organised crime through 
the introduction of directives.289 The introduction of a directive would provide the 
fundamental rules of a common strategy, which ought to be transferred into national law 
and afford the opportunity to overcome the three international legal instruments’ 
weaknesses.  
 
6.2.1. The freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime 
 
 Organised criminal groups employ criminal activities as a mean to gain proceeds, 
which are, subsequently, used to reinforce the organisation itself and to pursue further 
criminal activities, such as money laundering and corruption. An efficient strategy against 
organised crime ought to target the organised criminal group’s proceeds in order to 
suppress its criminal activities and impede the commission of further ones. The 
confiscation of proceeds of crime constitutes an efficient sanction in order to weaken the 
criminal organisations’ activities.290 In order to address the aforementioned, the European 
Union introduced Directive (2014/42/EU) on the freezing and confiscation of 
instrumentalities and proceeds of crime.  
 
 The directive defines the proceeds of crime as ‘any economic advantage derived 
directly or indirectly from a criminal offence’.291 These include any property ‘whether 
corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, and legal documents or instruments 
evidencing title or interest in such property’292 or any instrumentalities used or useful to 
perpetration of criminal activities.293 The directive provides for direct confiscation and 
value confiscation, leaving it to member states to choose which measures to implement. 
Moreover, the directive proposes the use of extended confiscation for serious offences, 
such as the crime of participation to a criminal organisation set forth in the 2008 
framework decision. It is important to note that confiscation may only take place following 
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a final judgment. In exceptional circumstances, there is the possibility of non-conviction 
based confiscation because the suspect or accused is ill or has fled. However, the FD does 
not address other grounds such as immunity and is limited to offences that are liable to 
result in pecuniary benefit. Finally, as does the UNTOC, the directive enables the 
confiscation of properties belonging to third parties provided that it is based on ‘concrete 
facts and circumstances’.294 The term third parties, is broad enough to include relatives, but 
specifically excludes bona fide persons.295  
 
 The new directive requires the adoption of measures enabling the freezing of assets 
and covering both prohibitions on use and the temporary seizure of property, as well as 
measures aimed at ensuring the management of frozen property. Such freezing orders may 
be issues by any competent authorities and remain in force as long as required, but any 
property must be returned if no confiscation order is adopted.296 Further, ‘the new 
Directive includes an express obligation for member states to ensure the execution of 
confiscation orders and to enable the detection and tracing of property even after the 
conviction or the criminal NCB [non-conviction based] proceedings’.297 Finally, various 
procedural safeguards are introduced which include the right of the accused to be informed 
of any freezing or confiscation orders and the right of third parties to claim ownership or 
other property rights.298 
 
 The directive sets forth minimum rules that member states of the European Union 
must apply based on the principle of mutual recognition of domestic decisions regarding 
confiscation. With regards to investigative power and access to financial information, the 
directive stipulates the relevant requirements in greater detail than the UNTOC. Member 
states may, for example, carry out financial investigations once the investigation for the 
underlying criminal activities has already been completed. Non-conviction based 
confiscation is advocated within international standards, but is not expressly required by 
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the directive. The directive also addresses the proper management of seized assets, which 
the UNTOC does not, likely because asset management is subject to domestic variances. 
Interestingly, the directive does not address the disposal of confiscated proceeds of crime 
or property. The issue is only referenced once in article 10 paragraph 3 which requires 
states to ‘consider taking measures allowing confiscated property to be used for a public 
interest or social purposes’.299 As a whole, the directive does not substantially differentiate 
from the UNTOC’s provisions on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and 
proceeds of crime. 
 
6.3. Cooperation in criminal matters: Towards the creation of a single area of justice? 
 
Article 18 of the UNTOC provides minimum standards for mutual legal assistance 
to be applied in the absence of a mutual legal assistance treaty with another state party. On 
a European Level cooperation in criminal matters has been enhanced since the adoption of 
the Treaty of Maastricht with transnational organised crime forming a fundamental field 
within the area of freedom, security and justice.300 However, it was not until the Treaty of 
Amsterdam that more binding measures were introduced, such as the 2000 Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, 
the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the European Evidence Warrant (EEW) and the 
European Investigation Order (EIO).    
 
The EU convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters was introduced so as 
to supplement to provisions and to facilitate the application of the 1959 Council of Europe 
Convention on Mutual Assistance. The EU convention aims to strengthen cooperation 
between judicial, police and customs authorities. Its scope goes beyond the 1959 Council 
of Europe convention and the UNTOC, as policing and law enforcement issues are beyond 
these international instruments scope.  That being said, for the most part the Council of 
Europe Conventions has contributed to the evolution of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. Moreover, there are various bilateral agreements in place between member states 
regarding mutual legal assistance. We shall now turn to more innovative instruments 
concerning mutual legal assistance, such as the European Arrest Warrant, the European 
Evidence Warrant and the European Investigation Order.  
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The framework decision, which introduced the European Arrest Warrant, was 
adopted in 2002 with the aim of implementing the principle of mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions and eliminating the formal extradition procedure among member states. 
The principle of dual criminality has been removed and the principle of non-surrender of 
nationals no longer constitutes an impediment to extradition.301 The EAW has been viewed 
as an effective tool for the prosecution and conviction of criminals. Extradition times have 
reduced from an average 9 months to 43 days,302 and formalities have decreased due to the 
removal of political checks and the establishment of direct contact between member states’ 
judicial authorities. However, the EAW displays numerous weaknesses such as the lack of 
an adequate framework of protection of human rights or the fact that dual criminality and 
nationality are still operative in various member states. Within the European Union, the 
standards of protection of human rights are not uniform, and so it is important that ‘a 
judicial scrutiny is devised which goes beyond a ‘ticking boxes exercise’’.303 The 
framework decision ought to, for example, introduce explicit grounds for refusal based on 
the infringement, or risk of infringement, on human rights so as to guarantee the same level 
of protection for all citizens. Further, where the EAW has been used as an alternative to 
more appropriate mutual legal assistant instruments it may fail to comply with the rule of 
law. In particular, since numerous ‘EAWs are being issued with no proper regard to 
proportionality’304 by judicial authorities, resulting in EAWs being issued for petty crimes. 
To sum up, while the EAW is certainly a success since it speeds up cooperation, it is an 
instrument, which may inhibit individual freedoms and liberties as no protective dimension 
is added.    
 
 The European Evidence Warrant was introduced so as to standardise evidence 
requests, expedite procedures and limit the grounds for refusal of requests.305 Unlike the 
aforementioned EAW, the EEW does not aim to replace existing transfer rules and 
procedures. The EEW defines evidence as ‘objects, documents and data’, thereby 
permitting the collection and transfer of a wide range of materials. However, certain 
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evidence, such as the interviewing or taking of statements from suspects, witnesses or 
victims, is excluded. Whereas the EAW resulted in the partial abolition of dual criminality, 
the ‘EEW uses more stringent language to afford less discretion to national legislatures 
when implementing the legislation’.306 Furthermore, with regards as the judicial control of 
evidence transfer, the EEW affords greater procedural safeguards and also introduces 
grounds for refusing to recognise or execute a request. The European Evidence Warrant is 
a more complex instrument than the European Arrest Warrant, which is aligned with the 
existing MLA framework and attempts ‘to draw fine jurisdictional lines on coercive 
powers and judicial safeguards’.307  
 
 The European Investigation Order was introduced with the adoption of directive 
2014/41/EU and represents a milestone for judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The EIO replaces a majority of existing 
legal instruments in the area of judicial cooperation with a single instrument, which aims to 
expedite and facilitate the gathering and transfer of evidence in cross-border investigations. 
The EIO replaces the rules on evidence gathering of the EEW and those provided for 
within the EU convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters. The EIO applies to 
various investigative measures directed at the gathering of evidence, except joint 
investigation teams and evidence collected by the former. The EIO constitutes a single 
instrument for the requesting of cross-border evidence and for securing it. Thus, it aims to 
make judicial cooperation more agile and expedient. That being said, the protection of 
fundamental rights has not significantly improved, especially those of the defendant and 
victims. Moreover, certain provisions on investigative measures lack clarity, ‘the impact of 
the DEIO on the rules contained in the FD EAW on the temporal transfer of detained 
persons, or also the important issue of the data protection of information transmitted in 
execution of an EIO’308 have not been adequately addressed. Nevertheless, in comparison 
to the European Arrest Warrant, the EIO approaches the principle of mutual recognition in 
a more reserved manner. Yet, when compared to the system of evidence gathering through 
MLA, the EIO symbolises an improvement towards the implementation of the mutual 
recognition principles. 
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 The European Union’s approach to mutual legal assistance is shifting towards the 
principle of mutual recognition. However, instruments such as the European Arrest 
Warrant and the European Investigation Order display similar weaknesses to previous 
instruments, which must be overcome to create improved opportunities to combat 
transnational organised crime and to achieve a European area of justice.  
 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
 The European Unions’ framework for combatting transnational organised crime 
does not substantially differ from the United Nations’ framework, albeit introducing more 
detailed provisions. The added value of the framework decision introduced in 2008 in 
approximating member states’ legislation in the field of organised crime appears rather 
low. Especially, since implementation and failure to comply cannot be brought before the 
European Court of Justice. That being said, the Treaty of Lisbon provides the opportunity 
for more sustainable and consistent policy-making in the field of organised crime.309 The 
‘fundamental difference between traditional legal assistance and ‘the European way’ lies in 
the principle of mutual recognition applied within the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’.310 Thus, the European Union may be better equipped to combat transnational 
crime by reinforcing EU integration in this area,311 whilst the international legal framework 
strongly relies on state parties transposition of international norms. 
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CHAPTER VII 
STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
 
Transnational organised crime poses a growing threat to national and international 
security.312 Organised criminal groups are expanding, diversifying their activities, resulting 
in the convergence of once distinct threats. The international legal framework for 
combatting transnational organised crime is no longer equipped to deal with these ever 
expanding threats. Accordingly, coordinated action at the international level must be 
reinforced through the strengthening of the international legal framework using traditional 
and non-traditional measures. Traditional measures are measures, which are currently 
already encompassed within the international legal framework to combat transnational 
organised crime, such as international cooperation or law enforcement cooperation. Non-
traditional measures include such measures as the establishment of transnational criminal 
law or the use of peace operations to curb TOC.  
 
7.1. Traditional measures to combat transnational organised crime 
 
7.1.1. International cooperation 
 
 International cooperation has an essential role in combating transnational organised 
crime. However, Gerber observed that there is a ‘growing divergence between the 
jurisdictional needs of the international system and the conceptual structures provided for 
this purpose by international law’.313 Consequently, international cooperation must be 
reconceptualised in order to increase its effectiveness. Although state parties are wary with 
regards to mandatory obligations brought about by international law and suppression 
conventions, the incorporation of the former into domestic law enables states to satisfy 
collective interest, effectively tackle domestic and international problems and improve 
their national systems. 
 
In today’s globalised society, soft law’ instruments ought to be used in addition to 
‘hard’ law enforcement tools so as to encourage socially responsible behaviour.314 ‘Soft 
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law’ instruments may be particularly valuable to combat TOC, given the difficulty of 
finding consensus on its the legal framing and the need to adapt to the ever-changing 
nature of this multifaceted crime. Furthermore, incentive schemes including positive 
incentives, such as developmental assistance, and negative incentives, for example the 
imposition of financial sanctions, have been introduced to induce state parties’ to adhere to 
the international prohibition regime. However, as stated by the International Peace 
Institute, these have to be imparted cautiously because such incentives are often ‘closely 
linked to the interests of those states that control such incentive structures, rather than to 
considerations of the long-term need for a recipient state to fight TOC’.315 States must 
ensure that they develop long-term strategies aimed at strategically defeating transnational 
organised crime through normative harmonisation of ‘common terminology, definition, 
and conceptions of the conduct to be controlled’316, whilst introducing appropriate 
sanctioning and regulatory mechanisms. Examples of such strategies included the United 
Nations’ Counter-Terrorism Strategy or the UN Millennium Development Goals. It is 
important that such strategies be developed in cooperation with various stakeholders, such 
as member states, international organisations, civil society and the private sector.317 
 
Cooperation must transcend borders, as it is essential for ‘successful domestic 
prosecutions as well as to eliminate safe havens’318 for organised criminal groups and 
ought to be reviewed regularly in order to keep pace with evolving practices so as to allow 
broad and expeditious cooperation.319 
 
7.1.2. Mutual legal assistance 
 
 Mutual legal assistance agreements between states are of paramount importance for 
obtaining assistance in the investigation or prosecution of transnational organised crime. 
For instance, mini-mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT) have been integrated into 
suppression conventions, such as the UNTOC. These mini-MLATs tend to rely on existing 
mutual legal assistance arrangement and are to be applied ‘without prejudice to existing or 
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future legal assistance agreements between the parties, and their procedural provisions 
only operate if the requested and requesting state are not already bound by an existing legal 
assistance agreement, unless they decide to use mini-MLATs’320 instead. This chapter will 
focus on the importance of human rights implications, as well as further improvements to 
be made to MLA agreements. 
 
Mutual legal assistance agreements have been widely criticised as they raise 
important human rights implications, such as the lack of grounds of refusal based on said 
implications or limited defence rights. Although MLA is not considered such a ‘direct and 
far-reaching intrusion into the personal liberty of the individual’321, it nevertheless raises 
human rights issues, as there is no substantive line of division between judicial 
cooperation, administrative and mutual legal assistance.322 An example of such a human 
rights violation is the landmark European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decision in 
Soering v. United Kingdom. Soering was charged with murder in the United States, 
subsequently arrested in the United Kingdom following an extradition request by the 
United States. The ECHR subsequently pronounced that extradition to the United States 
would constitute ‘inhuman treatment’ and violate article 3 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, because Soering would face the 
death penalty and the UK would actively facilitate a treatment that was territorially 
prohibited.323 Currie opines that ‘logic and the Soering principle suggest that to deny that a 
co-operating state is complicit, and thereby responsible, in a human rights violation 
resulting from the conduct of a criminal prosecution is to deny legal effect to the rights 
themselves’.324 Hence, grounds for refusal of MLA requests ought to be introduced. 
However, by imposing such grounds for refusal, the very flexibility of mutual legal 
assistance may be restricted. That being said, state parties ought to adopt a human-rights 
oriented approach with regards to the development of the law of international criminal 
cooperation. The International Law Association supports such an approach, provided that 
‘there are substantial grounds for believing that the rendering of such assistance would 
result in a serious violation of the rights of any person […] under customary international 
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law, or the domestic law of the requested state’.325 Lastly, the United Nations approach to 
MLA ‘means also that the persons concerned (suspects and victims in particular) remain 
objects of MLA and cannot derive from MLA scheme rights to gather evidence’,326 for 
example.  
 
Mutual legal assistance is still primarily a model of sovereign state-to-state 
cooperation, subject to the discretionary power of the executive.327 Further, MLAT’s rarely 
include coercive measures and special investigative techniques, and should the 
aforementioned be included, they are subject to rigorous rules and procedures of the 
domestic law of the executing state. 328 A majority of MLATs do not include new digital 
investigatory techniques, such as cross-border surveillance. In these cases, law 
enforcement authorities may use alternative investigatory techniques that do not comply 
with the existing MLA framework. Furthermore, in order to overcome practical and 
procedural problems, state parties should obtain assistance in building capacity to address 
frequently occurring problems through, for instance, the ‘development and use of 
checklists of evidentiary requirements to be satisfied for a request to be accepted’329 and 
the ‘use of standardized forms and guidebooks’. 330 The use of such aids will facilitate the 
capacity of institutions and agencies to deal with requests for MLA and information, and 
may be used to train personnel with regards to the legal requirements for MLA. Finally, so 
as strengthen and improve mutual legal assistance, states ought to consider widening the 
scope to include the transfer of proceedings, mutual recognition of judgments, and the 
transfer of prisoners, as the latter provisions remain infrequent.331 
 
Mutual legal assistance treaties ought to be modified so as to take into account 
human rights implications and the interests of the defence. Further, MLATs should address 
changes in society, as well as practical and procedural problems.  
 
7.1.3. Law enforcement cooperation 
 
																																																						
325 ibid 166. 
326 Vervaele (n 155) 1359. 
327 ibid. 
328 ibid. 
329 Yvon Dandurand, Gherardo Colombo and Nikos Passas, ‘Measures And Mechanisms To Strengthen 
International Cooperation Among Prosecution Services’ (2007) 47 Crime Law Soc Change 261, 271. 
330 ibid 271. 
331 Matti Joutsen, ‘International Instruments on Cooperation in Responding to Transnational Crime’ in Philip 
Reichel and Jay Albanese (eds), Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice (SAGE Publications, Inc. 
2014). 
CHAPTER VII 
	
90 
 International law enforcement cooperation has been promoted given the important 
role that effective information exchange and cooperation between law enforcement 
agencies has played in combatting transnational organised crime. The investigation of 
criminal activities requires international police cooperation ‘to display the same ingenuity 
and innovation, organisational flexibility and cooperation that characterise the criminal 
organisations themselves’.332 Law enforcement ought to become more proactive and 
intelligence-led so as to effectively tackle TOC, especially since it is currently often 
characterised as being antiquated and reactive in nature.333 However, since the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, law enforcement cooperation has increased as crime detection and 
deterrence has risen on the agendas.334 International law enforcement cooperation has 
primarily manifested itself through the establishment of international organisations, the 
development of common legislative frameworks, and regional or bilateral cooperation 
between states.  
 
 There is currently only one international platform for law enforcement cooperation, 
the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), and, unfortunately, it 
primarily concerns itself with standardised communication.335 Nevertheless, it provides 
valuable law enforcement experience, resources and provides limited assistance in training 
and operations. Despite its reach, its constitution remains non-binding and the agreement 
of police forces to cooperate is not mandatory and characterised by ‘diverse policing 
structures, practices and standards’.336 Further, states often prefer to conduct international 
activities unilaterally rather than turning to INTERPOL as they may ‘face a number of 
obstacles namely, incompatible legal and judicial procedures, differences in law 
enforcement style, culture, technological capability and policies which can hinder 
cooperative policing efforts against TOC’.337 States may also use such an international 
organisation unjustly and for political ends to further their own objectives. INTERPOL 
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provides a system for international police cooperation, which is increasingly necessary in 
today’s world. 
 
 Effectively combating TOC requires the development of a supranational legislative 
framework to enable constructive coordination and cooperation and to strengthen 
international efforts.338 Any such framework would have to account for the divergences in 
procedural legislation and law enforcement methods and to provide for mutual recognition, 
the latter reducing the need to substantially modify states’ legislative and law enforcement 
frameworks.339 Notwithstanding, such an instrument would have to allow for differences in 
national policing, strategy and legislation.340 Moreover, such an instrument would have to 
facilitate the exchange of information to assist, for example, the United Nations in 
developing an assessment of TOC, which allows for tactical developments and proactive 
strategies to be devised.341 Given that international police cooperation is expensive, the 
pooling of resources could alleviate the financial burden on states and would permit skills, 
experience and expertise to be exchanged. Besides, powers ought to be given to law 
enforcement agencies, seen that ‘in many cases legal requirements for prosecution of 
criminals are seen as inhibiting police and other law enforcement bodies attempting to 
apprehend criminals’.342 These powers could include, for example, the extension of law 
enforcement powers of surveillance or data retention to obtain elusive evidence.343 
Provisions for direct bilateral contacts, police liaison officers and joint investigation teams 
ought to be included, seen that these constitute effective forms to investigate and prosecute 
TOC. These provisions must however include common standards and accepted practices 
and ensure that a basic legal framework be provided.   
 
 To this day, the capacities of international law enforcement agencies to identify and 
curb transnational organised crime remain fragmented. Whilst international organisations 
such as INTERPOL and exiting international instruments play a critical role, further 
collaborative arrangements ought to be drafted so as to establish a solid global framework 
and in order to remove any loopholes that criminal organised groups could exploit. 
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7.1.4. Special investigative techniques 
 
 The UNTOC address special investigative techniques (SITs) in article 20, 
introducing the use of informants, surveillance and undercover operations. Such techniques 
are of particular importance to proactive law enforcement and complex investigations, but 
are often hindered by the varying domestic laws regulating the use of these techniques. 
With regards to transnational organised crime, these techniques ‘can be used to reduce the 
impact of strategic surprise from evolving criminal threats and environmental change’.344 
 
 Special investigative techniques are numerous, diverse and constantly evolving. 
Nevertheless, what they all have in common is that they tend to be disguised and that their 
use may interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms. Therefore, it is important that 
these techniques be used ‘in accordance with respect for fundamental principles, namely 
the principle of legality, the principle of respect for human rights, the principle of utility 
and proportionality of these means.’345 Common standards must be established to assure 
their proper use and improve international criminal cooperation in matters concerning 
SITs. Furthermore, given the risk posed to victims of such techniques, ‘there must be an 
intervention plan in the event that evidence emerges that a victim is being harmed or is 
likely to be harmed’346 guided not only by domestic legislation, but also by international 
instruments in the field of international cooperation. The European Court, for example, 
favours a system of external review with regards to SITs so as to assure that the limits of 
legality are not breached.347 Introducing such a mechanism of review as well as applying 
the principle of proportionality will enable states to ‘define the right balance between the 
interests of a criminal investigation and the protection of the rights of citizens’.348 
 
 Special investigative techniques are useful when dealing with organised criminal 
groups ‘because of the inherent difficulties and dangers involved in gaining access to 
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information and gathering intelligence on their operations’.349 Legislation and standards 
associated with SITs must be reassessed to reflect technological advances, taking account 
of fundamental rights and freedoms, and to enable international cooperation.  
 
7.2. Non-traditional measures to combat transnational organised crime  
 
7.2.1. Transnational criminal law? 
 
 Transnational criminal law (TCL) emerged as a distinct branch of transnational law 
appertaining to transnational criminal cases, which ‘rests on the assumption that states may 
exercise power across borders in the field of criminal law’.350 To date, an agreed definition 
of transnational criminal law does not exist. 
 
The so-called classic definition, brought forth by Jessup in the 1950s, argues that 
transnational law regulates actions or events that transcend domestic borders.351 Boister, 
however, has adapted this definition for the criminal law context, as ‘crimes established 
through treaty obligations in multilateral crime suppression conventions such as the 1988 
Vienna Convention – the so-called ‘treaty crimes’ or ‘crimes of international concern’.352 
As such, it may be seen as an area within transnational legal pluralism, which ‘brings 
together insights from legal sociology and legal theory with research on global justice, 
ethics and regulatory governance to illustrate the transnational nature of law and 
regulation’.353  Transnational criminal law only becomes apparent when analysing 
domestic legal systems so as to discern their transnational features.354 Boister’s definition 
appears to centre on a law enforcement approach that encompasses emerging transnational 
crimes such as human trafficking through the ‘governance of transnational criminal 
actions’ by way of suppression conventions.355 However, this definition may be viewed as 
too narrow and exclusive, given that Boister takes a top-down approach and excludes other 
fields of law. It appears contradictory for the scholar to promote interdisciplinary 
discussions, whilst simultaneously limiting the term TCL to domestic penal law. Further, 
not only are other fields of law excluded, but by emphasising the use of suppression 
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conventions, Boister also disregards potentially influential ‘soft law’ instruments. That 
being said, Boister argues that transnational crimes are rapidly evolving and a growing 
number of suppression treaties, such as the UNTOC, have been implemented, instituting 
TCL as ‘probably the most significant existing mechanism for the globalization of 
substantive criminal norms’.356 Transnational criminal law’s importance is also highlighted 
by the fact that it draws a clear distinction between the core crimes under international law 
and those crimes that may cater to fewer universal values and interests, but are of 
fundamental importance nonetheless.  
 
Another issue arises when multiple legal systems coexist, as ‘they may offer a 
flexible solution to newly emerging problems in cross-border situations, but this eventually 
leads to a minefield for the individual who must abide by such (possibly conflicting) 
laws’.357 An individual’s interests may be pushed to the background as international treaty 
norms and many autonomous sets of domestic criminal norms dominate TCL, bearing in 
mind that the latter should be seen ‘as an agglomeration of all these rules, procedures and 
practices’.358 Moreover, the defendant’s rights may be obstructed, since TCL does, as of 
yet, not constitute a coherent legal framework but a conglomeration of laws, devised from 
multiple subsystems of national ius puniendi.359 
 
 Boister argues that the system of transnational criminal law is growing in 
importance. However, it is not apparent to what extent the system substantially differs 
from treaty law, such as the UNTOC, although TCL encompasses the rules of national 
jurisdiction. Its fundamental strength lies in the fact that it provides a guideline for 
international cooperation to combat transnational organised crime in the sphere of 
international criminal law.  Individual interests must go hand in hand with the 
reinforcement of legal frameworks that transcend domestic borders for alleged criminal to 
become ‘members of multiple normative communities, local, territorial, extraterritorial, 
and non-territorial in nature’.360 
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7.2.2. Establishment of a transnational criminal court 
 
 International courts do not currently deal with transnational organised crime, as the 
Rome Statute currently limits the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to 
the core crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, due to the different 
character of TOC.361 It was argued that national courts are equipped to adequately 
prosecute TOC crimes since an effective system of international criminal cooperation was 
already in place. In general, the role of international courts may be said to be threefold: (i) 
to counterbalance institutional deficiencies; (ii) to protect subjective rights and ensure 
compliance with international law and (iii) to reinforce domestic capacities.362 Moreover, 
decisions of international courts such as the ICC do not merely affect individuals, but the 
general public. That being said, the principle of complementary is of paramount 
importance since it legitimises ‘the exercise of authority in which the relationship between 
domestic and international courts is at play’ and ‘serves as a normative yardstick to guide 
and evaluate the jurisprudence of international courts’.363 Given the growing importance of 
transnational organised crime and their impact on the world at large, we shall now discuss 
whether the ICC’s jurisdiction ought to be broaden to include TOC or whether a separate 
‘transnational criminal court’ ought to be established.  
 
 The International Criminal Court was established to suppress crimes already 
established in customary international law and to put an end to impunity, uphold the rule of 
law and work as a deterrent. Moreover, the principle of complementarity makes the ICC a 
court of ‘last resort’, which only becomes active when national jurisdictions have failed to 
address the core crimes. Despite its limited jurisdiction, allowing the ICC to prosecute, 
‘especially in instances when national agencies do not have the ability, capacity, or 
political will to prosecute or extradite alleged offenders’364, could strengthen universal 
criminalisation of TOC. Allowing prosecution by the ICC would allow states to focus on 
prevention and minimise the impact TOC has on society.365 Scholars have argued that 
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TOCs could be prosecuted under the existing mandate of the International Criminal Court 
given that, for example, the trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Kayishema found that the ICTR 
statute also applied to non-state actors and the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac ‘explicitly held that a policy or plan is not even an element of crimes against 
humanity under customary international law’.366 That being said, it is rather unlikely that 
transnational crimes will be brought before the ICC given the high thresholds for satisfying 
the requirements of the Rome Statute. Moreover, states will probably not regard TOC 
grave enough to solicit intervention by the ICC. Another possibility would be to add 
further crimes to the ICC statute. However, inclusion may prove difficult ‘in light of the 
lack consensus among state parties with regards to the definitions of certain crimes, the 
ICC caseload, and the political influence over treaty crimes from powerful state parties’.367 
The ICC ought to prosecute those transnational organised crimes that agree with its statute, 
but should refrain from adding further crimes to its statute. Instead, a separate court to 
prosecute TOC should be established. 
 
 An alternative would be the establishment of a transnational criminal court (TCC) 
as proposed by Boister. US senator Arlen Specter proposed the development of a court 
‘that would have provided institutional support to states in their domestic prosecutions of 
transnational crimes or to which the state could refer the case for trial if it so wished’.368 In 
this case, states would retain sovereign control of criminal law whilst having the option to 
externalise their adjudicative jurisdiction without facing the obstacle of proving that the 
crime in question is a customary crime.369 Contrary to the ICC, a TCC would be a 
prosecutor’s court that states could take advantage of ‘if they felt that it would be a breach 
of their reciprocal obligations to other injured states to do nothing’.370 In Boister’s opinion, 
a TCC would have to be permanently available and would have to review their 
admissibility of cases ‘based on criteria of gravity of the crime, transnationality of effect of 
the conduct, the involvement of an organized criminal group, and so forth’371 as laid out by 
the UNTOC. A transnational criminal court may be seen as a further tool to be used by 
states to combat TOC established by, and based upon the provisions laid out in suppression 
conventions.  
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 Transnational organised crime cannot currently be effectively tackled given the 
limitations of the current system to investigate, prosecute and convict organised criminal 
groups. These groups exploit the differences between states’ criminal justice systems and 
legal loopholes to their advantage. International prosecution would create an opportunity to 
overcome the systems deficiencies, complement domestic enforcement efforts and ‘would 
illustrate that no one is above the law. [It] would serve as stabilising reference points for 
floundering national criminal justice systems’.372  
 
7.2.3. The role of non-state actors 
 
 Organised criminal groups are non-state actors, whose legal obligations ought to be 
recognised under international human rights law and humanitarian law in order for these 
actors to be held accountable.373 It is ever more so relevant since today’s conflicts are 
deemed to be of non-international character. That being said, ‘While it is largely 
uncontested that international humanitarian law imposes certain obligations on ANSAs 
[armed non-state actors], the application of other bodies of international law, in particular 
human rights law, is controversial’.374 Nonetheless, scholars argue that contemporary 
international human rights law has evolved to a point where one can contend that non-state 
actors bear legal obligations and the ‘horizontal application of international human rights 
law at the international level must be established’. 375 
 
 International Human Rights Law (IHL) presupposes the existence of an armed 
conflict under article 1 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.376 
For IHL to apply to an armed non-state actor, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka or potentially the Mexican cartels, an armed conflict as defined by 
IHL must be present and the group in question must have a sufficiently developed 
structure. Organised criminal groups, in exceptional circumstances, may evolve into an 
organisation ‘possessing powers and/or structures similar to those of states’.377 
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Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether for instance the situation in cities and 
regions strongly affected by TOC, such as Rio de Janeiro or parts of Mexico, ‘suffice to 
trigger the applicability of the law of non-international armed conflict’.378 In order to 
determine whether IHL ought to be applied to the above-mentioned conflicts depends on a 
comprehensive factual assessment as advanced by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Rutaganga.379 To better demonstrate the possibility that IHL may 
be applied to organised criminal groups, the intensity and organisational requirement will 
be discussed. The intensity criterion is ‘primarily meant to identify situations amounting to 
a severe public emergency, which in turn justifies the application of a legal regime that 
profoundly changes the rules and principles governing the modern constitutional state in 
peacetime.’380 It is argued that it is unlikely that organised criminal groups may destabilise 
a country in such a way that a public emergency manifests itself; the vagueness of the 
intensity requirement, which qualifies attacks as ‘armed’, may be broadly interpreted as 
‘the threshold [that] can be reached by the cumulative effect of various low-intensity acts 
that have resulted in a high number of victims and that disrupt the functioning of the state’. 
381 Although it may be difficult to show that organised criminal groups possess a 
sufficiently developed structure to define a military strategy and co-ordinate and carry out 
military operations,382 organised criminal groups ‘should not be considered to be 'civilians' 
during armed conflict’383 given their level of involvement in conflict. This is particularly 
the case in countries such as Mali, where the cooperation between terrorists and organised 
criminal groups indicated that those who held the power were accountable for the actions 
of these non-state actors.384 Moreover, organised criminal groups may not merely be 
qualified as ‘civilians’ if they field the de facto power to contest the legitimacy of the state, 
‘such as had almost been the situation in the prisons of Colombia, Honduras and El 
Salvador’.385  
 
 Transnational organised crime benefits from the instability created by war and 
weak governance, as it is a source of cash flow (for example, the Sahel region). Although 
organised criminal groups violence is not usually driven by an ideology or by legitimate 
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political intentions, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions could nonetheless be 
applicable ‘since the groups appear to undertake an armed conflict against the State, 
participating directly in hostilities and therefore perhaps benefit[ing] from the minimal 
provisions of international humanitarian law’.386 Should international humanitarian law be 
applicable to these non-state actors, they may furthermore be bound by jus cogens norms.  
 
7.2.4. Peace Operations 
 
 Transnational organised crime poses a significant and growing threat to peace and 
security. In 2012, the Security Council recognised in a presidential statement on peace 
building that transnational organised crime may ‘negatively impact the consolidation of 
peace in countries emerging from conflict’.387 Consequently, the implications of TOC for 
stabilisation processes and peace operations ought to be considered, since these have 
largely been absent from mandates, strategic guidance and competence bestowed upon 
peace operations. TOC has only been referenced a few times, as in the 2008 Capstone 
Doctrine or the New Horizon process that unfolded from the 2009 New Partnership 
Agenda.388 Conflict affected and fragile regions, such as Afghanistan that has a substantial 
narco-economy, would benefit from planning and operational support to tackle TOC.  
 
 Peace operations by the United Nations have so far rarely included active measures 
to combat TOC within their mandates. Instead measures have been implemented and 
developed on an ad-hoc basis. That being said, the mere presence of peace operations may 
act as a deterrent for organised criminal groups. In order to effectively address TOC, peace 
operations require specific capabilities for information gathering and analysis so as to gain 
insight into the organised criminal groups and their activities. Importantly, the United 
Nations would have to integrate a variety of international and national experts so as ‘to 
develop adequate, integrated policy responses on strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels’.389 The threats posed by TOC would have to be integrated in mission mandates and 
planning, with experts supporting assessment and planning to reinforce capacities for 
analysis and response. Mandates ought to also clearly state long-term and short-term goals, 
such as building state capacity or the enforcement of human rights and international law, to 
ensure that peace operations can effectively tackle TOC. As multiple actors are involved in 
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TOC, from organised criminal groups to government elites, it may be advisable to develop 
national justice capacity by, for example, ‘placing particularly vulnerable sectors under 
international oversight for an interim period’.390 Peace operations must also be given the 
opportunity to cooperate with other actors, such as other affected states and IGOs, since 
they are limited to their area of operation while organised criminal groups act 
transnationally.  As a result, peace operations may ‘(i) serve as delivery vehicles (for 
governmental functions such as border control and fighting organised crime), (ii) serve as a 
coordination mechanism between other actors […] or (iii) more simply act as a 
clearinghouse and analytical focal-point’.391  
 
 Peace operations have also influenced or even reinforced transnational organised 
crime, as they may provide stability and predictability that allows TOC to flourish. 
Moreover, international sanctions or embargoes have inadvertently rewarded political and 
military structures affiliated with organised criminal groups, ‘altering economic 
opportunity structures in a manner that favours those who are already connected to illicit 
commerce’.392 An example is the so called ‘Arizona Market’ in Bosnia, an open-air black 
market that set-up in close proximity to thousands of peacekeepers and brothels that 
catered for the commercial sex demand that these peacekeepers generated. 393  
 
 Nowadays, peace operations ought to be empowered to more effectively combat 
TOC, since they may prove effective with their security, peace-building and state-building 
tasks. A more proactive approach should be adopted so as to create a multidisciplinary 
strategy for stabilising societies, including measures to address and eradicate TOC, since 
peace operations and TOC converge in regions riddled by conflict. 
 
7.3. Conclusion 
 
 In order to protect human rights and the rule of law, a more efficient approach is 
needed to combat transnational organised crime. Organised criminal groups currently 
benefit from legal loopholes, taking advantage of globalisation and as a result prevent 
states to efficiently suppress TOC on their own. Hence, a targeted and comprehensive 
approach is required on an international level. Traditional measures, such as international 
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cooperation, must be regularly reviewed and more coordinated action promoted. A human 
rights approach ought to be included within mutual legal assistance treaties and must 
provide an adequate legal framework so as to ensure efficient international cooperation in 
criminal matters. International law enforcement agencies must possess the resources and 
expertise to identify and curb transnational organised crime, further cooperating to prevent 
criminals from benefiting from any legal loopholes. So as to keep up with technological 
advances, special investigative techniques ought to be used to detect and prosecute TOC. 
However, it is important that SITs are adequately regulated and measures are in place that 
guarantee the protection of human rights and prevent abuse. With regards as non-
traditional measures, it is worth considering the system of transnational criminal law as it 
provides a solid foundation for international cooperation in the sphere of criminal law. 
Moreover, the existence of such a field of law would enable to establishment of an 
international prosecution mechanism to overcome the limitations of the current system to 
investigate, prosecute and convict organised criminal groups. Since transnational organised 
crime has risen to the ranks of a security problem, it is worth considering whether the 
organised criminal groups associated with these crimes ought to be liable under 
international humanitarian law as armed non-state actors. And finally, the mandate of 
peace operations ought to be expanded to include measures to counter TOC, in addition to 
their security, peace-building and state-building tasks.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
There are no easy solutions to the fight against transnational organised crime. Until 
now, international cooperation in the fight against transnational organised crime has been 
characterised by the definitional opaqueness of TOC and the complexity intrinsic to law 
enforcement and judicial cooperation on an international level. That being said, the 2000 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) marks a major development 
in international cooperation in criminal matters. Its flexibility, namely the fact that it is 
broad in scope and provides a ‘tool-box’ for international cooperation, allows it to address 
a variety of transnational organised crime while fulfilling relatively straightforward 
conditions, i.e. transnationality and involvement of an organised criminal group. However, 
its flexibility is also its weakness, since the UNTOC imposes few specific obligations upon 
states parties. Moreover, mandatory obligations are often formulated in such a way so as to 
accommodate the means and needs of state parties as is the case with Article 11(6), which 
‘reserves the description of offences and applicable defences ‘to the domestic law of the 
State Party’’394 and as such ‘the impact of the principle of legality and lex certa is more 
difficult to assess’.395 New practices and legal innovations, such as the establishment of 
joint investigation teams or the integration of other fields of law, need to be considered in 
order to address all facets of TOC, be it cross-border criminality or economic changes. An 
integrated and comprehensive strategy, which takes into account the fluid, globalised 
nature of criminal networks, as well as their sophisticated tactics, needs to be developed. 
As such, the research conducted aimed to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the 
United Nations’ Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and the 
European Union’s (EU) framework, as well as take advantage of a comparative analysis so 
as to determine whether the international legal system may benefit from elements 
employed at EU level.  
 
The analysis has shown that the strengths of the UNTOC lie in the fact that the 
convention is not subject specific, broad in scope and its definition of transnational 
organised crime may be applied to a wide array of crimes. Furthermore, the convention 
provides a solid basis for mutual legal assistance and law-enforcement cooperation. Unlike 
a majority of crime suppression conventions, such as the UNCAC or the 1988 UN Drug 
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Convention, the UNTOC may be used so as to prosecute and punish a wide range of 
criminal activities, from drug trafficking to identity-related crime, provided that these 
activities are committed by an organised criminal group and are ‘serious’ in nature. The 
convention is broad in scope as it potentially incorporates all transnational serious crime, 
including, for example, wildlife and forest crime. Moreover, the UNTOC’s scope is 
broadened as it ‘pursued a double strategy of prevention – one strategy against the basic 
crimes (those proscribed in the Protocols and as serious crimes by the parties) and one 
against the logistical/organizational crimes ([…] participation in an OCG, corruption, 
money laundering, and obstruction)’.396 With regards as mutual legal assistance, article 18 
provides a broad basis for assistance sought for offences, which are transnational in nature 
and involve an organised criminal group. Article 18 improves MLA through the 
establishment of central authorities, as well as the inclusion of new possibilities for 
enabling investigations through the transmission of information and evidence. Further, the 
UNTOC places greater emphasis on liaison and consultation than previous instruments. 
The convention also recognises the importance of law-enforcement cooperation and 
promotes the effective exchange of information and close cooperation between agencies in 
order to avert and tackle all forms of transnational organised crime. Finally, the ‘specific 
offences in the UNTOC to which it applies in terms of article 3(1)(a) also contain within 
their elements OCG, serious crime, and transnationality concepts, showing how all-
pervading these concepts are as triggers to enable international cooperation within the 
UNTOC’.397  
 
Conversely the UNTOC’s weaknesses stem, in part, from its strengths. The 
convention’s flexibility means that it cannot be used to prescribe to state parties what to 
criminalise and when to apply its provisions, as the convention may be applied to a variety 
of criminal activities and discretion remains with state parties. Furthermore, the definition 
breadth of TOC means that it may be seen as a principle rather than a specific crime. As 
such, state parties’ complicity relies on non-specified serious crimes. As such, it appears 
beneficial had specific crimes been enumerated or elements included that describe 
organised criminal groups, provided that the former are regularly updated. In addition to 
the above, the UNTOC does not address single, ad hoc operations, which are increasingly 
responsible for TOC today. The UNTOC also disregards the increasingly horizontal based 
structure of organised criminal groups, as well as the growing nexus between TOC and, for 
																																																						
396 ibid 137. 
397 ibid 136. 
CHAPTER VIII 
	
104 
example, terrorism or global finance. Moreover, mutual legal assistance and, in particular, 
law-enforcement cooperation must be further developed and adapted to TOC so as to 
enable, among others, effective intelligence sharing and cross-border police cooperation. 
That being said, law-enforcement cooperation remains controversial, with joint 
investigation teams being undermined and judicial and policing authorities being view by 
state parties as exclusively sovereign authorities. As a whole, the state parties remain wary 
of using the UNTOC as it does not provide a clear, elaborate concept upon which states 
may rely, legislate and train around. Finally, with regards as implementation, key 
challenges include, but are not limited to, ‘state capacity, national concern, institutional 
constraints on a domestic level and the availability of monitoring mechanism’398 as well as 
external and internal factors. In order to improve the UNTOC’s effectiveness and assure its 
implementation, state parties ought to support the implementation of an effective 
monitoring mechanism. Rather than establishing a new mechanism, existing instruments 
should be strengthened with support of the international community. All state parties 
concerned ought to participate in a more dynamic monitoring mechanism, intended to 
cultivate constructive dialogue.  
 
The United Nations’ Convention against Transnational Organised Crime definition 
of organised crime incorporates various transnational organised crimes, which can function 
as basis for international criminal cooperation. Although it enables broad suppression, 
precise denunciation is almost impossible. The UNTOC merely serves as a framework of 
international legislation and facilitates cooperation between state parties. It does not 
constitute an operational treaty, which oversees specific crime-fighting activities.399 That 
being said, the convention symbolises a milestone with regards as international criminal 
law, as it brought about unprecedented opportunities for transnational cooperation in 
criminal justice. Yet, its framework could have been strengthened through the inclusion of 
further mandatory obligations for state parties rather than merely functioning ‘as just 
another case of soft law codifying international best practices in criminal justice’.400 
 
The comparative analysis has shown that weaknesses remain and regional 
frameworks are not necessarily more effective, although regional cooperation in the field 
of transnational organised crime is said to be more effective as it takes advantage of 
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opportunities offered by a politico-economic union, such as the European Union. That 
being said, regional cooperation may subvert common global standards or lead to criminal 
activities spreading into more vulnerable regions. The EU’s framework for combatting 
transnational organised crime does not substantially differ from the United Nations’ 
framework, albeit introducing more detailed and mandatory provisions. Approximation of 
member states’ legislation in the field of organised crime remains rather low, albeit the 
introduction of framework decisions. Especially, since implementation and failure to 
comply cannot be brought before the European Court of Justice. Nevertheless, the Treaty 
of Lisbon provides the opportunity for more sustainable and consistent policy-making in 
the field of organised crime.401 The ‘fundamental difference between traditional legal 
assistance and "the European way" lies in the principle of mutual recognition applied 
within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’.402 Thus, the European Union may be 
better equipped to combat transnational crime by reinforcing EU integration in this area,403 
whilst the international legal framework strongly relies on state parties’ transposition of 
international norms.  
 
Against this backdrop, the following is suggested with a view to future 
developments. A more efficient approach is needed to combat transnational organised 
crime. Organised criminal groups currently benefit from legal loopholes, taking advantage 
of globalisation and as a result prevent states from efficiently suppressing transnational 
organised crime. Hence, a targeted and comprehensive approach is required on an 
international level. Traditional measures, such as international cooperation, must be 
regularly reviewed and more coordinated action promoted. A human rights approach ought 
to be included within mutual legal assistance treaties and international law enforcement 
agencies must be provided with the resources and expertise to identify and curb TOC. With 
regards to non-traditional measures, it is worth considering the system of transnational 
criminal law as it provides a solid foundation for international cooperation in the sphere of 
criminal law. Since transnational organised crime has risen to the ranks of a security 
problem, it is worth considering whether the organised criminal groups associated with 
these crimes ought to be liable under international humanitarian law as armed non-state 
actors. And finally, the mandate of peace operations ought to be expanded to include TOC, 
as they may prove effective with their security, peace-building and state-building tasks. 
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Yet, in order to effectively tackle TOC, measures and aspects beyond the realm of this 
thesis, must also be considered. After all, cooperating with the private sector and 
enhancing international cooperation through networks could be alternative routes to 
success.  
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